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and subtle issues related to religious liberty.2  While an appeal to
religious liberty in the context of betrayal and abuse is bound to
raise eyebrows, priest sex abuse cases inevitably lead to defenses
and arguments centered on religious liberty.  These arguments
arise from the very nature of civil litigation with its broad and
systematic discovery of the workings of a religious institution, the
secular standards juries use to evaluate the actions of religious
organizations, and the potential large compensatory or punitive
damage awards against a church.
The inevitability of religious liberty claims has proven particu-
larly true in Oregon.  After the Oregon Supreme Court in Fear-
ing v. Bucher3  subjected the Church to a kind of strict or
vicarious liability for its priests’ sexual abuse of children,4 the
Church’s most significant legal defenses have stemmed from its
constitutional status as a religious entity.  This Article seeks to
provide an overview of the unique issues raised by these cases
with a particular view toward the interaction between religious
liberty and civil liability.
This Article also uses a “classic case” of priest sexual molesta-
tion of a minor as a template for illustration and analysis, occa-
sionally adding or changing facts for illustration.  Part I examines
the various policy reasons for imposing liability on a church for
the abuse of minors by its priests, its “religious,”5 and its other
employees.6  In Part II, we examine in some detail the realities of
child abuse, including the policy considerations for an extended
statute of limitation in these cases.  In Part III, the Article looks
at actual theories and principles of liability used against the
Church and discusses the defenses, assertions, and claims—cen-
tering on questions of religious freedom—by which the Church
has attempted to avoid liability or limit exposure to damages.
2 With the filing of bankruptcy proceedings in the western United States by three
dioceses of the Church (Tucson, Spokane, and Portland), other questions of religious
liberty have arisen.  These proceedings have resulted in the adjudication of a handful
of important and previously undecided free exercise and religious liberty questions
concerning ownership of church property and issues of charitable trust law. See
Joseph A. Rohner IV, Comment, CATHOLIC DIOCESE SEXUAL ABUSE SUITS, BANK-
RUPTCY, AND PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE:  IS THE “POT OF GOLD”
REALLY EMPTY?, 84 OR. L. REV. 1181 (2005).
3 328 Or. 367, 977 P.2d 1163 (1999).
4 Id.  at 375-76, 977 P.2d at 1167.
5 A person, usually a nun, monk, or priest belonging to a religious order, such as
the Franciscans, Benedectines, etc., is referred to as “a religious.”
6 Cases involving priests are by far the most prevalent, but other child abuse cases
involving nuns, monks, and Catholic school teachers exist as well.
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Throughout this several-part process, the religious liberty is-
sues involved in the classic case scenario will be explained and
explored with care and—it is hoped—sensitivity to the legitimate
claims of religion.
Yet in almost every instance where there is a claim or defense
of religious liberty, we argue that one of two realities emerge
upon closer inspection.  The first is that the claim in fact fails to
raise a legitimate issue of religious liberty.  The second reality is
that when a claim of religious liberty is balanced against the in-
terests of society, the “compelling interests”7 of protecting chil-
dren from sexual exploitation by trusted adults and rendering
justice override the claim of religious liberty.
These twin realities reflect the notion, expressed for centuries
in Anglo-American legal traditions, that there must be a balanc-
ing of civil and natural rights, even if this sometimes means that
the unbridled expression of religious liberties must be curtailed
by operation of the system of civil justice.  Even devout defend-
ers of religion have followed this notion,8 and it remains true to-
day that no civil right—even a natural right—is or can be
7 This phrase is from an older line of First Amendment religious liberty cases in
which a governmental burden on religious practice is only justified if the societal or
governmental interest at stake is a “compelling interest.” See, e.g. , Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
8 According to Edmund Burke:
If civil society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for
which it is made become his right.  It is an institution of beneficence; and
law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule.  Men have a right to live by
that rule; they have a right to do justice; as between their fellows, whether
their fellows are in politic function or in ordinary occupation.  They have a
right to the fruits of their industry; and to the means of making their indus-
try fruitful.  They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents; to the
nourishment and improvement of their offspring; to instruction in life, and
to consolation in death. Whatever each man can separately do, without tres-
passing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a
fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force,
can do in his favour .
2 BURKE SELECT WORKS 69 (E.J. Payne ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1888) (em-
phasis added).  Consider also this passage:
In some people I see great liberty indeed; in many, if not in the most, an
oppressive, degrading servitude.  But what is liberty without wisdom, and
without virtue?  It is the greatest of all possible evils; for it is folly, vice, and
madness, without tuition or restraint.  Those who know what virtuous lib-
erty is, cannot bear to see it disgraced by incapable heads, on account of
their having high-sounding words in their mouths.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 412 (J.C.D. Clark
ed., 2001).
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unlimited in any society with diverse and competing claims of
religious and secular authority.  However, it is also argued here
that there are ways in which any threats to religious liberty can
and should be minimized through prudence and an appreciation
for the legitimate claims and benefits of religious exercise.
A. The Classic Case:9  Part 1
1. The Boy
Stephen, named for the New Testament martyr and saint, was
the oldest of five sons born to a devout Irish Catholic family, the
Connorses.  He was born in 1955; at the time he filed suit in 2002
he was forty-seven.  His family moved to Portland from the East
Coast in 1961 when Stephen was six, and immediately they en-
rolled him at Our Lady of the Rose Catholic School.  The family
worshiped at the parish that housed the school.
Although both parents were Catholic and insisted on raising
Stephen and his brothers in the Church, neither his mother nor
father were very regular in attendance at Mass.  Perhaps his
mother was the more devout of the two, although Stephen knew
his dad did believe in God.  But Stephen’s dad worked sixty-hour
weeks at two jobs—his main job at the docks and a second job at
night as a custodian at a local public school.  By the time Sunday
rolled around, his dad was tired and looking forward to a day off.
Besides, he often was hungover on Sunday mornings:  he was a
hard-drinking man, almost certainly by today’s standards what
would be considered a functional alcoholic.
Often Stephen would wake up at night to hear his parents argu-
ing and, sometimes, the nauseating sounds of his dad’s massive
hands on his mother’s small body.  His dad was often violent
when drunk.  Fortunately, Stephen had only been hit a few times
through grade school.
The best times were when his dad would take Stephen and his
brothers fishing.  One time, when Stephen was ten, he even got to
go fishing alone with his dad.
His mother would go to Mass during the weekday mornings so
as to avoid the inevitable questions and glances from fellow pa-
rishioners if she were to go to Sunday Mass without her husband.
9 The facts presented in this hypothetical are a composite of actual facts taken
from over 100 different clients of O’Donnell & Clark who have been involved in
clergy sexual abuse.  Of course the actual names, specific places, and dates in this
hypothetical are fictional.
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It was at one such weekday Mass in the early summer of 1966 that
she first met Fr. Antonio Rossi, the new associate pastor.  Right
away she liked him; relatively young and energetic, “Father Tony”
was charismatic, outgoing and funny, both in person and in his
homilies.  He was an outdoorsman, a hunter, and a fisherman.
She immediately thought that Stephen might also like him, so she
made sure she introduced herself and asked Fr. Tony, if he had a
chance, to say hello to Stephen when he said Mass at the school or
on a Sunday.  He was so nice about it, replying that he would be
glad to keep a lookout for Stephen.  That gave her more hope than
she dared admit.
2. The Priest (from All External Appearances)
Fr. Tony Rossi was a “Johannine Father”—a member of the Or-
der of St. John the Evangelist—as were all the priests at Our Lady
of the Rose.  It was a parish that for years had been staffed by the
Johannines as a service to the Archdiocese of Portland.  Portland
was one of two dozen or so dioceses around the country that the
Johannines helped staff as a part of their outreach ministry to the
larger Church.  In that way, Fr. Tony actually had two bosses
while in Portland.  His permanent boss, of course, was the head of
the Johannines, Fr. Francios Dubois, who was headquartered in
Boston; but while he was on assignment in the Archdiocese of
Portland, Fr. Tony was also working under the direct supervision
and authority of the Archbishop.
Under Canon Law, the Archbishop issued “faculties” to Fr.
Tony, a kind of deputization and authority to perform the sacra-
ments within the jurisdiction of the Archdiocese.  These faculties
were a kind of representation or even certification to Catholics in
Oregon that Fr. Tony was all the things a priest should be:  holy,
devout, dedicated wholly to the life of the Church, and, of course,
celibate.
The full truth was a bit more difficult than that.
I
WHY LIABILITY IS IMPOSED AGAINST A CHURCH
What is the justification for imposing monetary liability against
a nonprofit organization engaged in religious exercise, education,
and many charitable activities that inarguably benefit society?
More to the point, what are the legal theories by which we have
decided that the damage done to children by pedophile priests
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provides enough of a reason to impose liability against such an
otherwise respected institution?
There are really two main legal theories:  first, vicarious liabil-
ity against the Church through the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior for the tortious acts of its employee or agent, and second,
basic negligence of the institution itself in selection, supervision,
or retention of an employee-priest.  We will examine each in
turn.
But before we venture into this discussion, it is important to
see how the relationship between Fr. Tony and Stephen devel-
oped from the priest’s normal duties—duties sanctioned in this
case by both the Johannine Fathers and by the Archdiocese.  This
development is significant because the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior imposes liability upon a principal for the acts of its agent,
and in the priest abuse context the tortious sexual abuse arises
out of an authorized relationship sanctioned and sponsored by
the Church.
A. The Classic Case:  Part 2
1. The Relationship
It did not take long after Mrs. Connors had her talk with Fr.
Tony for him to seek out Stephen.  It happened one day in the
autumn of Stephen’s sixth grade year, just after he turned eleven.
To everyone’s surprise, Fr. Tony came into the classroom.  Sister
Rita Clare, the teacher, was both unnerved and flattered that he
would visit.  Everyone liked Fr. Tony, including the nuns who
staffed the school from the Order of the Holy Child Jesus.
So Sister Rita Clare was pleased when he came in that day and
sat in the front while she taught math for about ten minutes.  After
that, he politely interrupted and asked her if he could “borrow”
one of the boys for a bit.  Stephen Connors nearly wet his pants
when Fr. Tony pointed him out and said kindly, “Stephen, could
you come with me, please?”
Once in Fr. Tony’s office, the priest explained to Stephen that he
was looking to strengthen the ranks of altar boys and asked him if
he would like to serve God and his church in this way.  When
Stephen said, “I guess so,” Fr. Tony was obviously pleased and
said that Stephen could start training with the other boys this com-
ing Saturday.  But Fr. Tony also said that he wanted Stephen to be
a member of St. Peter’s Guild—a special honor for only a very few
altar boys, selected secretly by one priest in each parish.  Would
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Stephen like to be a member of the Guild?  Stephen was both
proud and surprised to be selected.  He said yes.
Fr. Tony also said he understood Stephen liked fishing, so how
about if they went fishing sometime?
And so began their friendship.  All fall, each Wednesday, Fr.
Tony would come pull Stephen out of class and take him to his
office.  He would spend a bit of time talking about Stephen’s per-
formance last Sunday at Mass and about St. Peter’s Guild.  Then
they would go fishing.  Sometimes afterward, they would go have
hamburgers and talk about fishing or sports.  Every so often on
Friday nights, Fr. Tony would take Stephen to a movie or to get ice
cream.
Once or twice, Stephen opened up to Fr. Tony about his dad’s
drinking and the fighting between his parents.  Fr. Tony responded
with great warmth and support, saying he would certainly remem-
ber them in his prayers and during Mass.  Stephen felt really lucky
that he got to be such great friends with Fr. Tony.  He knew, of
course, that Fr. Tony spent time with other boys.  Fr. Tony helped
coach the Catholic Youth Organization football team and even
spent some time helping out with the Boy Scout troop sponsored
by Our Lady of the Rose.
Everyone liked Fr. Tony, including Stephen’s brother Thomas,
who was younger by two years.  Stephen noticed that Fr. Tony and
Thomas would sometimes hang out on Tuesday nights before
Scouts.  That was good, Stephen thought.  Fr. Tony was a great
guy.  Even his next younger brother Matthew had said something
about Fr. Tony taking him to his office one day to show him his
new fly rod.  But Stephen knew that only he was a member of St.
Peter’s Guild, and only he was Fr. Tony’s best fishing buddy.  Fr.
Tony had said so.
Then one day about two months after Stephen’s induction into
St. Peter’s Guild, after their usual office visit but before they went
fishing, Fr. Tony asked Stephen if he wanted to make confession.
Now, Stephen had only been to confession on a handful of occa-
sions, and he was always a little uncomfortable with it.  He never
knew what to say.  So he was quite surprised when, after he con-
fessed to Fr. Tony about sometimes being mad at his brothers, Fr.
Tony, through the wall of the confessional, asked him if he had
ever had “impure thoughts.”  Stephen didn’t really know what the
priest meant, so Fr. Tony explained.  Thoughts about girls, he said,
about their bodies, about them being naked, anything like that.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 8 15-MAR-07 8:06
488 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 481
Stephen gulped hard and said, “Yeah, sometimes.”  Fr. Tony asked
other questions, even more embarrassing ones, about Stephen
touching himself, and after a long, long pause, Stephen again said,
“Yeah, sometimes.”  Then, somewhat abruptly, Fr. Tony ended the
confession, and led Stephen into an upstairs room in the rectory.
There, he explained that the Pope had appointed one priest in
every parish—the same one who was to choose the altar boys for
St. Peter’s Guild—to make sure that the boys of the parish were
pure in body, soul, and spirit.  In order to be pure, Fr. Tony ex-
plained gently, Stephen must not only tell Tony about his impure
thoughts and actions but must show them to him as well.  Fr. Tony
stressed to Stephen that if each time he made a confession and
acted out his impure thoughts, even if Tony had to help him act
them out, then he could perhaps be pure and holy as members of
St. Peter’s Guild had to be and receive absolution for his sins.
And, of course, Stephen would have to keep the secrecy of the
confessional, Fr. Tony reminded him.  If Stephen failed in either
charge, then, make no mistake, Stephen would be guilty of mortal
sin and would go to hell.
And so it began.
B. The Respondeat Superior Balancing Doctrine
Respondeat superior is an ancient idea in law, stretching back
at least to Roman times.10  It holds the “master” responsible for
the wrongdoing of the “servant” done in the ordinary course of
the servant’s duties.  It is automatic  responsibility—in other
words, without regard to whether the master independently and
personally did wrong.  If the master sends the servant and bene-
fits from the servant’s actions, then the master is responsible as a
matter of social policy and fairness when the servant causes in-
jury to a third party.
Ultimately, respondeat superior is, at its most bare reality, a
means of allocating monetary damages from the victim of tor-
10 O.W. Holmes, Jr., Agency , 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348-50 (1891) (tracing a
master’s liability for a servant’s acts to Roman law).  For a further discussion of the
history of respondeat superior, see THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 146-54
(1916); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency II , 5 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1891); and John
H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts:  Its History II , 7 HARV. L. REV. 383
(1894).  Holmes and Wigmore began at opposite premises but arrived at the consen-
sus that English law arose out of earlier, more barbaric systems in place prior to the
Norman Conquest. See Nelson P. Miller, An Ancient Law of Care , 26 WHITTIER L.
REV. 3, 3-4 (2004).
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tious conduct to the entity in the best position to compensate that
victim.11  This is indeed the case in Oregon, where “the doctrine
of respondeat superior is applied as a policy of risk allocation,
whereby an employer is held vicariously liable for certain injuries
caused by an employee. . . . The underlying rationale is that ‘the
[employer] rather than the innocent injured plaintiff is better
able to absorb and distribute the risk.’”12
“Which party is better suited to absorb risk” is the driving con-
sideration in the typical respondeat superior situation, but it is
not the entire rationale behind imposing this type of strict liabil-
ity in the child abuse context.
When dealing with employees who abuse a position of trust
and authority over children, respondeat superior liability is justi-
fied more as a means of balancing the damage inflicted by agents
in the course and scope of their agency against the benefit that
the principal gets from the agent’s work.  This forms the crux of
the rationale for imposing respondeat superior liability on
churches for the actions of religious employees.  The rationale in
the priest cases is that the priest “used the job to groom the
child.”13  Reference to the story of Stephen and Fr. Tony makes
clear that without the church-sponsored relationship of trust—
trust given by both the parents and the child—the perpetrator
would not have had occasion to abuse the boy.  The widely popu-
lar and trusted Fr. Tony was supposed  to spend time with boys,
win their trust, be a male role model, and be a sign of hope for
troubled mothers worried about their troubled sons.  Likewise,
Stephen was right—in the eyes of the Church and by common
sense—to trust the priest with his problems, to want to make his
confession, to be drawn to the charismatic young priest, to feel
special in his eyes, and to obey the directions of his priest and
pastor.
11 Thomas Baty characterized this balancing test less charitably:  “In hard fact, the
real reason for employers’ liability is . . . the damages are taken from a deep
pocket.” BATY, supra  note 10, at 154. See also  Jill Fedje, Liability for Sexual Abuse:
The Anomalous Immunity of Churches , 9 LAW & INEQ. 133, 142 n.70 (1990)  (“[I]t is
socially more expedient to spread or distribute among a large group of the commu-
nity the losses which experience has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of indus-
try, than to cast the loss upon a few.” (quoting Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour ,
23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 457-58 (1923))) (alteration to the original).
12 Hanson v. Versarail Sys., Inc., 175 Or. App. 92, 100-01, 28 P.3d 626, 630 (2001)
(quoting Farris v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 273 Or. 628, 637, 542 P.2d 1031,
1035 (1975)).
13 See  discussion infra  Part III.A.
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Under those facts, the argument goes, since the Church gets all
the benefits of the good priests, why as a matter of social policy
should the Church not carry the risk of the few bad priests as
their employer and sponsor?  After all, the Church benefits when
Catholic boys become Catholic men who are loyal to the Church
and consequently sustain the Church through the next genera-
tion.  Is it really fair that the burden should rest on the innocent
victim of the abuse—that as a grown man Stephen should have to
deal on his own with the costs of his broken life or his long jour-
ney toward wholeness?  Or should the Church that introduced
him to Fr. Tony not bear that cost?  Assuming that the friendship
arose out of a trust relationship sponsored by the Church, at the
least a jury should be able to make that decision.  These, in any
event, were the arguments made to the Oregon Supreme Court
in Fearing v. Bucher  and the arguments that the court apparently
found persuasive.
The more common and well-publicized theory for holding
Church entities responsible for child abuse is negligence, the
well-worn tort that simply holds one party responsible when his
or her conduct proximately causes injury to another.  In order to
understand why the Archdiocese of Portland and the Johannine
Fathers might be liable in negligence in our story, it is necessary
to know what the Church knew about Fr. Tony, when they knew
it, and what they did and did not do about it.
C. The Classic Case:  Part 3
1. The Priest from the Inside and What Really Happened in
Portland
The full truth about Fr. Tony was a bit more difficult than the
certifications that the Johannines and the Archdiocese made about
him when they placed him at Our Lady of the Rose.  The fact is,
Fr. Tony Rossi had been ordained a priest for nearly a decade and
already this was his fourth assignment in just the last six years.
Tony had had some problems in earlier assignments, and this was
his third “second chance.”  But Fr. Dubois, the Johannine Supe-
rior, liked Fr. Tony and wanted him to do well.  Besides, the
Johannines had a lot of time, energy, and money invested in Tony.
And, of course, since Vatican II and the advent of the American
1960s, the Johannines had had a net decline in the number of new
vocations—many of the younger and middle-aged priests were
leaving, and new postulants were in decline.  Also, Tony had such
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obvious gifts.  He was richly educated and articulate, personable,
and a good fundraiser.  People, especially young people, just
flocked to him.  Fr. Dubois could actually imagine him as having
quite a future in the Johannine hierarchy.  He just had to stick to
his vows and keep the drinking under control.
Fr. Dubois was quite sure that it had been the alcohol that had
led to Fr. Tony’s indiscretions in his prior assignments.  And now
that Fr. Tony had been through an alcohol treatment program at a
Catholic facility back East, joined Alcoholics Anonymous, and
had made a sacramental confession—the penance included a sa-
cred vow that he would watch his relationships with boys more
closely—Fr. Dubois was hopeful.
Still, just to make things simpler and to protect both Fr. Tony
and the Order, Fr. Dubois had not sent the Portland Archdiocese
Fr. Tony’s personnel file.  And Portland had not asked for it.  If
they had, of course, they would have seen the 1961 letter of com-
plaint that had come from the family at the parish in Kansas City
and the 1964 correspondence between the Bishop of Santa Fe and
Fr. Dubois.
Both letters were naturally in the secret archives—a kind of deep
storage kept under Canon Law.14 Both letters concerned Fr.
Tony’s interactions with boys and had the potential to cause scan-
dal for the Church and for Fr. Tony.  One letter was a bit vague,
but the other was quite specific and more troubling.  Still, Fr. Du-
bois had made sure that the only references in the main file were to
Tony’s alcohol problem.  But even that—along with the several
transfers from one parish to another—would be a flag to any
bishop with his eyes open.  Thankfully, thought Fr. Dubois,
neither the Archbishop of Portland nor the Vicar for the Clergy—a
kind of priest personnel director—had asked about the reasons for
Tony’s reassignment to Portland, nor had they asked for his file.
14 Canon 489 on “The Secret Archive” states in section 1 that “[i]n the diocesan
curia there is also to be a secret archive, or at least in the common archive there is to
be a safe or cabinet, completely closed and locked, which cannot be removed; in it
documents to be kept secret are to be protected most securely.”  1983 CODE c.489,
§ 1.
Commentary to this section notes that while Canon 489 does not list the docu-
ments that are to be held in the secret archive, “[a]n illustrative list could be con-
structed by reference to other parts of the code” including registries of dispensations
from occult marriage impediments (c.1082), registries of secret marriages (c.1133),
warnings and rebukes as penal remedies (c.1339, § 3), and other documents relating
to the penal process. JOHN P. BEAL ET AL., NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF
CANON LAW 642-43 (2000).
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Portland, like everywhere else, desperately needed priests, so they
were glad for the help from the Johannines.
To go back further, however, Fr. Tony’s trouble had actually
started in seminary.  He had taken first vows as a postulant in the
Sangre de Christo Order in the Southwest, but after two years of
formation, they had decided that he would not be a good fit for
priestly vocation.  They were never quite specific about why.  The
only files that the Johannines had ever seen merely mentioned the
problem of “temperament.”  But when Tony had asked them
whether he could apply to become a priest with the Johannines,
who had spread the word starting in the late 1950s that they were
looking to expand their preaching ministries, the Sangre de Chris-
tos gladly gave their okay.
The Johannines, including Fr. Dubois, were impressed with
Tony’s persistent desire to become a priest.  And his explanation
about his false start had made sense to Fr. Dubois—that the real
problem with the Sangre de Christos was that they were old school
and not open to a more modern presentation of the Gospel.  The
whole problem had really just been a personality clash between
him and the Sangre de Christo Superior.  Unlike the difficult let-
ters from his former assignments, none of these early difficulties
were even in the secret archives of Fr. Tony’s files with the Johan-
nines.  Fr. Dubois had sent these materials back to the Sangre de
Christos.  There was no reason, now that Tony was to be Johan-
nine, that a past problem, whatever it was, should mar Fr. Tony’s
name with them.
Nevertheless, Fr. Dubois observed how difficult it would have
been if Portland had asked for Tony’s entire file, including his
seminary files.  If they had, of course, Fr. Dubois would have had
to tell them everything.  Under Canon Law as well as a sort of
unwritten code of conduct between members of the Church hierar-
chy, it is one thing to keep troubling material in the deep archives
or at an old seminary, but it is another thing to give an outright
false answer to a direct question from a bishop.  Fortunately, the
Archdiocese of Portland had never asked.
Fr. Dubois hoped this was a sign that Fr. Tony was finally under
a more positive divine grace.  Fr. Dubois believed deeply in grace,
redemption, and the power of the Holy Spirit to change a man.
Even Fr. Dubois himself had been deeply changed after much
prayer and grace.  He recalled it had been over ten years since he
had had any women problems.  Though his and Fr. Tony’s
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problems were quite different in nature, Fr. Dubois believed that if
God could release him from his besetting sin, then God could re-
lease Fr. Tony from his.  Fr. Dubois was sure of it.
So Dubois made the assignment, Fr. Tony went to Portland, Ste-
phen and Fr. Tony became friends, and the confession rituals
began.
Then, about three years after Fr. Tony was transferred to the
Archdiocese of Portland, it all blew up again.  From Stephen’s per-
spective, it all ended abruptly.  One day, Fr. Tony was gone.
That’s all Stephen knew.  The nuns said he had been transferred.
That’s all they said.  Rumors were everywhere, but Stephen didn’t
really listen to them.  They said he was a drunk and that some
sailor here for the Rose Festival had gotten Fr. Tony in trouble
with the Archbishop.
Stephen kept wondering if he would come back, or at least write.
After all, Stephen remembered, Fr. Tony had gone away once
before for about thirty days.  Stephen’s mom had told him about
that.  She had said it was because Fr. Tony was exhausted and the
Archbishop had insisted he needed a rest.  But even then, they had
announced it from the pulpit.  This time, he was just gone and no
one ever said why.
What Stephen did not know about, and indeed what his mother
did not know about either, was the truth about Fr. Tony’s past, the
material in the Johannine files, and “Fr. Tony’s problem.”  The
Archbishop first learned about Tony’s problem about nine months
into his abuse of Stephen.  The Archbishop had gotten a phone
call.  It seems the police had picked up Fr. Tony, drunk and nearly
passed out, on the streets of downtown Portland one night during
the Rose Festival.  He and a young sailor on leave had been caught
in a compromising position with a teenage boy in a public park.
Upon learning this, the Archbishop called the Johannine Supe-
rior Fr. Dubois, asking if anything like this had ever happened
before.  That is when the Archbishop first learned that Fr. Tony
had a past problem with boys.  The Archbishop knew then that he
had a decision to make.  And so, upon recommendation from his
Vicar General and Fr. Dubois, the Archbishop decided to send
Tony for alcohol treatment.  He had seen other priests with this
problem, and almost always it seemed to be alcohol that was the
main problem.  And, of course, an insufficient prayer life.  So they
sent him to a Catholic facility in New Mexico to deal with his alco-
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hol problem and to get clear that he really must abide by his vow
of celibacy, especially when it came to boys.
D. The Rationale for Imposing Negligence Liability
In contrast to respondeat superior, liability for negligence is
based upon the allocation of liability to a party who fails to ex-
hibit reasonable prudence in conducting its affairs.15  All persons
have a “general common-law responsibility . . . to avoid conduct
that creates a specific risk of injury to others.”16  There would
appear little justification to exempt a religious organization from
liability for its own carelessness—especially an organization that
actively recruits children and families.  Indeed, with negligence,
the question of fairness in holding a party liable is not once-
removed from the direct actions of that party, as is the case with
respondeat superior.  Instead, negligence focuses on a party’s
own fault in behaving in a careless or reckless manner when such
behavior could foreseeably impact another’s interests.17
In the priest abuse context, particularly where Oregon’s ex-
tended child abuse statute of limitations comes into play, negli-
gence imposes liability for actions that constitute “knowingly
allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse.”18  However,
according to the Oregon Court of Appeals, this standard requires
15 According to the Oregon Supreme Court:
Negligence . . . is defined as the doing of that thing which a reasonably
prudent person would not have done, or the failure to do that thing which a
reasonably prudent person would have done, in like or similar circum-
stances; it is the failure to exercise that degree of care and prudence that a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in like or similar
circumstances.
Biddle v. Mazzocco, 204 Or. 547, 554, 284 P.2d 364, 368 (1955).
16 Garrison v. Deschutes County, 334 Or. 264, 271-72, 48 P.3d 807, 811-12 (2002).
17 Conduct that causes a foreseeable risk of harm is the first element of negligence
in Oregon.  Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or. 1, 17, 734 P.2d 1326, 1336
(1987).
18 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1) (2005).  ORS 12.117 only applies to negligence ac-
tions where the institutional defendant had some reason to know of the perpetra-
tor’s danger prior to the abuse. See Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or. App. 425, 442 n.8,
444, 936 P.2d 1011, 1021 n.8, 1022 (1997), rev’d on other grounds , 328 Or. 380, 977
P.2d 1157 (1999) (noting that in the legislative history of ORS 12.117, the sponsors
of the bill envisioned the law would apply to conduct that allowed, permitted, or
encouraged child abuse, in light of reports of abuse by clergy).  ORS 12.117 is the
only way in which most child abuse cases are justiciable, as delayed discovery in
child abuse cases makes suits brought contemporaneous to the abuse exceedingly
unlikely. See  discussion infra  Part II.A.  ORS 12.117’s “knowingly” language makes
negligence a rare vehicle for victims to bring suit. Id.
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“actual knowledge” instead of mere “constructive knowledge.”19
In the case of Fr. Tony, it no doubt might be considered ordinary
negligence for the Archdiocese of Portland to have failed to ask
for the files on Fr. Tony from the Johannine Fathers.  That is,
they should have known about his propensities, but without
more, this probably does not constitute “knowingly allowing
child abuse.”
On the other hand, a jury could easily find that the Archbishop
“knowingly” allowed, permitted, or encouraged child abuse once
he knew of Tony’s past problems and placed Fr. Tony back in
ministry.  After all, at this point the Archbishop had been
warned about Fr. Tony’s propensities with children in other con-
texts; he had also failed to notify parishioners at Our Lady of the
Rose that Fr. Tony had a problem with boys, thus “knowingly
allowing, permitting or encouraging” child abuse.  At some point
“foreseeability” becomes “predictability.”
Another interesting question is what to do with Fr. Dubois’s
sincere religious belief that God could and would change Fr.
Tony.20  This belief is consistent, at least doctrinally, with Church
teaching on repentance, forgiveness, and transformation by di-
vine grace.  But can we fairly ask a secular jury to judge this relig-
ious thinking?
As illustrated by Fr. Dubois’s hopeful faith, the theory of negli-
gence has been held to present First Amendment problems in
some cases.21  But while negligence does impose secular stan-
dards of care on the employment decisions of religious institu-
tions, the better analysis, including Oregon’s, seems to be that all
persons, including churches, are held to the law’s reasonable per-
son standard of care.22
Moreover, the negligence case of Stephen Connors against the
Archdiocese and the Johannine Fathers is fundamentally unlike
other cases that might trigger religious liberty concerns.  The
Archdiocese and Our Lady of the Rose held the parish out to the
19 Lourim , 147 Or. App. at 444, 936 P.2d at 1022.
20 See  discussion infra  Part III.B.2.
21 Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liablity, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitu-
tional Protection , 75 IND. L.J. 219, 234-35 nn.42-45 (2000) (collecting cases).
22 Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions
to Protect Others:  Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are Required , 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 11, 44 n.156 (2005) (collecting cases holding that the First Amendment pre-
vents adjudication regarding whether church leadership negligently hired, super-
vised, trained, or retained clergy).  For questions that arise from imposing a secular
negligence standard on religious institutions, see discussion infra  Part III.B.2.
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despairing Mrs. Connors as a caring, loving, and safe place where
she could send her boys.  To her, the parish was a place where the
family was invited generally to enter and partake in the life of the
Faith.  Such a case stands in contrast to the more classic free ex-
ercise or establishment concern where the propriety of church
rules is debated among contending intrafaith factions.23  Ste-
phen’s case is simply not an instance of the secular order arbi-
trarily invading the inner workings of a religious organization; it
is a case of the secular order holding the organization to its own
very public representations that have injured third parties, in this
case an innocent boy.  It is hard to see why a negligence theory
should not be applied to the facts of these abuse cases.
But justified as it is in the first instance to impose liability on
the Church for abusive priests without considering claims of re-
ligious liberty, there is yet another complicating factor in these
abuse cases:  they are often brought thirty, forty, or even fifty
years after the abuse.  This raises, of course, many practical
problems for litigants.  But apart from that, for those unfamiliar
with the world of child sexual abuse, it raises outright questions
of legitimacy.
Why did they wait so long?  Is it just that they are jumping on
the bandwagon, or is it, as the Archbishop of Portland put it the
day he filed for bankruptcy protection, because these victims are
after the Church’s “pot of gold”?24  Is the very rationale for an
extended statute of limitations simply a kind of anti-Catholic big-
otry—as one bishop of the Church has argued?25  So these issues
demonstrate that in any discussion of issues of justice in the
priest abuse cases, it is necessary to understand how child abuse
impacts its victims’ ability to understand what has happened to
them.
The fact is most victims are simply unable to discuss their
abuse or recognize its impact until well into adulthood.26  Thus,
in order for child abuse victims to have a chance of recovery, an
equitable and realistic statute of limitations must take into ac-
count the very nature of child abuse actions.  While Oregon’s
23 E.g. , Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976)
(refusing to determine which bishop was properly seated under church rules).
24 See  Alan Cooperman, Archdiocese of Portland, Ore., Declares Bankruptcy ,
WASH. POST, July 7, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A31266-2004Jul6.html.
25 Charles J. Chaput, Suing the Church , FIRST THINGS, May 2006, at 13, 14.
26 The reasons for this delay are discussed infra  Part II.C.
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child abuse statute of limitations attempts to do just that, it is not
without complexity or controversy.
II
AN EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:  OREGON
REVISED STATUTE 12.117 AND THE IMPACT
OF CHILD ABUSE
Because the concerns surrounding child abuse are in fact dif-
ferent from most types of tort actions, Oregon, as many states,
has seen fit to enact an extended statute of limitations that allows
for delayed discovery of latent injury in child abuse cases.  The
following discussion examines both the structure and the ratio-
nale for the extended child abuse statute of limitations, including
the nearly incomprehensible damage that child abuse inflicts on
the psyche of the victim.
A. The Structure and Operation of Oregon Revised
Statute 12.117
The Oregon Legislature first enacted the special child abuse
statute of limitations found in ORS 12.117 in 1989 and subse-
quently amended it to allow for retroactive application.27  ORS
12.117 provides that child abuse victims, including victims of both
physical and sexual abuse, have until their twenty-fourth birth-
day to file suit for action based on child abuse or “conduct know-
ingly allowing, permitting or encouraging child abuse.”28
Yet because child abuse victims often do not realize that the
abuse has caused permanent emotional injury until later in life,
ORS 12.117 creates an important allowance.  The statute permits
an adult survivor of child abuse to bring suit “not more than
27 The amendment is as follows:
The amendments to ORS 12.117 by section 1 of this Act apply to all causes
of action whether arising before, on or after the effective date of this Act
[July 8, 1993], and shall act to revive any cause of action barred by the
operation of ORS 12.117 (1991 Edition).  Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, any cause of action that was dismissed or adjudicated before
the effective date of this Act based upon that provision of ORS 12.117
(1991 Edition) requiring that an action be commenced on or before the
plaintiff attains 40 years of age may be brought within one year after the
effective date of this Act as though the original proceeding had never been
commenced.
Act of July 8, 1993, ch. 296, § 2, 1993 Or. Laws 752 (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 12.117 (2005)).
28 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1) (2005).
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three years from the date the injured person discovers or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the injury or
the causal connection between the child abuse and the injury.”29
The statute even supersedes Oregon’s statute of ultimate repose,
which is normally ten years.30  In this way, ORS 12.117 allows an
adult of any age to bring suit against an abuser and the responsi-
ble institution31 within three years of making a causal connection
between child abuse and subsequent mental or emotional diffi-
culties experienced as a result of the abuse.32
In the context of ORS 12.117, it is important to note that a
victim’s awareness that he or she has been sexually abused is not
itself the “injury” that triggers the running of the statute of limi-
tations.  While this obviates the need for controversial repressed
memory evidence, the abuse–injury distinction has created con-
siderable confusion in applying ORS 12.117.  As the Oregon
Court of Appeals noted:
No plausible definition of “injury” can make perfect sense
in this statute. . . . A definition equating the “injury” with the
abusive conduct itself makes the statute unintelligible:  the
statute treats the abuse and the injury as logically and tempo-
rally distinct concepts, in that the “abuse” is said to cause  the
“injury,” and a thing cannot cause itself.33
However, when viewed in light of the psychological realities of
child abuse, it makes sense to draw a fine distinction between the
actual abuse and contemporaneous pain felt, and the recognition
later in life that child abuse causes lingering and severe damage
distinct from that initial abuse.  Again, our story shows why.
B. The Classic Case:  Part 4
1. The Betrayal and What Happened During “Confession”
Fr. Tony and Stephen met for confession every week.  Later it
became two and then three times a week.  Eventually, Fr. Tony
29 Id.
30 Id.  § 12.140.
31 Ironically and somewhat inexplicably, ORS 12.117 does not apply to govern-
mental child abusers and to governmental employers under the Oregon Tort Claims
Act. See id.  § 30.275(9).
32 Simple negligence of an institutional defendant will not trigger ORS 12.117 ab-
sent some knowledge held by the employer that the employee posed a danger to
children.  Lourim v. Swensen, 147 Or. App. 425, 444, 936 P.2d 1011, 1022 (1997),
rev’d on other grounds , 328 Or. 380, 977 P.2d 1157 (1999); see also  discussion infra
Part III.B.
33 Jasmin v. Ross, 177 Or. App. 210, 215 n.3, 33 P.3d 725, 727 n.3 (2001).
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explained to Stephen about the intense physical response that Ste-
phen would have upon showing Fr. Tony his impure thoughts—a
response that Fr. Tony called “the eruption of sin.”  Fr. Tony ex-
plained how it was good that it happened, because it was “liquid
evil” that was being pulled out of him.  Now thirteen years old,
Stephen knew that he must, indeed, have a lot of sin and evil in
him, not only because of the eruptions of sin, but because (he
dared not tell even Fr. Tony this) when the liquid evil came out of
him it actually felt good.  He wished he could confess that it felt
good, but he knew that this was something that was way, way too
bad even to confess.  He wondered if he would go to hell for being
so evil that he could not even confess truthfully.  He thought he
probably would.  He spent a lot of time wondering what hell
would be like.
Sometimes confession was not even done in the confessional, or
even at the church.  On several occasions Stephen made his con-
fession and acted out his sins and the eruptions of evil on the
banks of rivers where they fished, in the car on the way back, or
once after dark in the car in front of Stephen’s house.  They even
took several trips together, usually fishing trips, that spanned all
over the Northwest.  They went to Central Oregon, Eastern Wash-
ington, and even into British Columbia.  Always there was
confession.
Often Tony would drink fairly heavily.  On several occasions
later on, Tony actually passed out during or right after confession
in hotel rooms or churches where they stayed.  Once at one of the
churches in Washington, another priest joined them for confession;
Fr. Tony explained that he, too, was a Priest of St. Peter’s Guild.
He, too, drank heavily and participated in the ritual.
Then, one day, right after Stephen turned thirteen, Fr. Tony in-
sisted that it was time that Stephen learned to drink like a man.
After two beers, Stephen was dizzy and confused; after four, he
was nearly blacked out.  The next morning, had it not been for the
excruciating pain he experienced between his legs upon awaken-
ing, he might not even have remembered what had happened.
From then on, often there was beer before and right after confes-
sion.  Almost always beer, and almost always pain.
Stephen, of course, told no one.  He knew what would happen if
he broke the seal of the confessional.  Any good Catholic knew
that.  But even without that, Stephen did not want anyone to know
what was happening.  As he got older—thirteen, then fourteen—he
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started wondering if it was right for Fr. Tony to give him beer.  He
wondered about other things, too—like why Fr. Tony had erup-
tions of evil.  But he couldn’t tell anyone about his questions.  He
didn’t know what he would have said anyway, how he would have
explained it, and he knew no one would believe him.  Besides, Fr.
Tony was really important to him.  Stephen liked his friendship
and couldn’t imagine betraying his instructions.
Later, after Fr. Tony went away, Stephen was lost.  He felt to-
tally alone.  He got really depressed.  And angry.  Within a few
months he was drinking frequently on his own, even if he had to
steal the alcohol from his father.  By the time he was fifteen, he
was smoking marijuana—it helped him feel less angry.  Later he
did other drugs.  When he was high was the only time he wasn’t in
turmoil.  He dropped out of Cleveland High School after his soph-
omore year.  He had been kicked out of Central Catholic his fresh-
man year for drinking and for bad grades.  Unlike two of his
brothers, he never went to college.
Stephen just kept making bad choices, it seemed.  He hated au-
thority figures and could not trust anyone.  For thirty years, he was
angry almost all the time.  He often got in fights.  He couldn’t get
close to even his children.  He was depressed—clinically depressed
he found out later—for three decades.  He had serious sexual
problems.  Once when he was forty, he tried to kill himself with an
overdose, but he only ended up in the psych ward of a local hospi-
tal on a thirty-day commitment.  That was the only time since Fr.
Tony had left that he ever prayed.  And it didn’t work then either.
He had no faith in any kind of God.  And he absolutely hated the
Catholic Church.
He never told anyone about what happened with Fr. Tony—not
his parents, not his brothers, not any of his three wives, not anyone
in the three drug rehab centers he was in, not the marriage coun-
selor he saw with his third wife to deal with his anger and sexual
hang-ups, not even his friends in AA in 2000 when he finally got
clean and sober.  He told no one—until that day in 2002 when he
saw the familiar face in a photograph in the newspaper.  It was
there along with a story that ten men had filed suit against the
Archdiocese of Portland and the Johannine Fathers for sexual
abuse by one Fr. Antonio Rossi.  He would eventually learn that
two of the men were his brothers.  He had never known.  He
thought he was the only one.
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C. The Unique Nature of Child Abuse
Damage of a physical or sexual nature, when done to a child,
forms an emotional scar on the psyche that does not typically
reveal itself until later in life.34  In this way, child sexual abuse is
unlike virtually any other tort claim.  Child abuse looks very dif-
ferent depending upon whether the perspective is from a clini-
cian, an abuser, or a victim.  But all three views converge on this
truth:  pedophiles35 commit most of their crimes against children
who trust them.36  This means, of course, that pedophiles must
get themselves into a position where they can be trusted.  It also
34 See generally  David Viens, Countdown to Injustice:  The Irrational Application
of Criminal Statutes of Limitations to Sexual Offenses Against Children, 38 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 169, 176 (2004) (describing effects of childhood sexual abuse).
35 While the technical term for attraction to postpubescent teenagers is
ephebophilia, for simplicity, the term pedophilia is used in this Article.  The Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders  defines pedophilia as follows:
The paraphilic focus of Pedophilia involves sexual activity with a
prepubescent child (generally age 13 years or younger). . . . Those attracted
to females usually prefer 8- to 10-year-olds, whereas those attracted to
males usually prefer slightly older children. . . . Individuals with Pedophilia
who act on their urges with children may limit their activity to undressing
the child and looking, exposing themselves, masturbating in the presence of
the child, or gentle touching and fondling of the child.  Others, however,
perform fellatio or cunnilingus on the child or penetrate the child’s vagina,
mouth, or anus with their fingers, foreign objects, or penis and use varying
degrees of force to do so. These activities are commonly explained with
excuses or rationalizations that they have “educational value” for the child,
that the child derives “sexual pleasure” from them, or that the child was “sex-
ually provocative”— themes that are also common in pedophilic
pornography. . . .
Individuals may limit their activities to their own children, stepchildren,
or relatives or may victimize children outside their families.  Some individ-
uals with Pedophilia threaten the child to prevent disclosure.  Others, par-
ticularly those who frequently victimize children, develop complicated
techniques for obtaining access to children . . . . Except in cases in which
the disorder is associated with Sexual Sadism, the person may be attentive
to the child’s needs in order to gain the child’s affection, interest, and loy-
alty and to prevent the child from reporting the sexual activity. . . . The
course is usually chronic, especially in those attracted to males.  The recidi-
vism rate for individuals with Pedophilia involving a preference for males is
roughly twice that for those who prefer females.
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 571 (4th ed. text
rev. 2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
36 See  Reuben A. Lang & Roy R. Frenzel, How Sex Offenders Lure Children , 1
ANNALS SEX RES. 303, 305 (1988) (suggesting that as many as seventy-five to eighty
percent of all child sex abuse occurs in the context of trusted adult fathers, neigh-
bors, or authority figures); see also  Psychology Today’s Diagnosis Dictionary:
Pedophilia, http://www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/pedophilia.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2006) (“Offenders are usually family friends or relatives.”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 22 15-MAR-07 8:06
502 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 481
means they are very good at winning the trust of children and
their families.37  This is why the ranks of schools, athletic leagues,
churches, and Scouts are so frequently ideal sites for
pedophiles.38
It also means these child abuse victims will remain scarred for
life.39  They will come to despise their own existence and will be-
come covered with “shame”—a catch-all term modern psychol-
ogy uses to describe absolute self-hatred and loathing—as a
result of childhood sexual trauma.40  They stand a substantially
greater chance of becoming addicts, commonly to drugs, alcohol,
gambling, or sex.41  Most ironically, they stand a very high chance
37 KENNETH V. LANNING, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., CHILD
MOLESTERS:  A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 55-56 (4th ed. 2001), available at http://
www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf. See also CARLA VAN DAM,
THE SOCIALLY SKILLED CHILD MOLESTER:  DIFFERENTIATING THE GUILTY FROM
THE FALSELY ACCUSED 2-4 (2006).
38 An estimated two percent of U.S. Catholic priests are pedophiles, with an addi-
tional four percent who are sexually drawn to older youths. A.W. RICHARD SIPE, A
SECRET WORLD:  SEXUALITY AND THE SEARCH FOR CELIBACY 162 (1990).  Be-
tween 1952 and 2004, “children made more than 11,000 allegations of sexual abuse
by priests.  The 4,450 accused priests represent about 4 percent of the 110,000 priests
who served during the 52 years covered by the study.” Draft Survey:  4,450 Priests
Accused of Sex Abuse , CNN.COM, Feb. 17, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/02/16/
church.abuse/index.html.
Patrick Boyle estimated the Boy Scouts had at any given time during the last
quarter of the past century as many as two thousand child-molesting Scout leaders.
PATRICK BOYLE, SCOUT’S HONOR:  SEXUAL ABUSE IN AMERICA’S MOST TRUSTED
INSTITUTION 271 (1994).  These included former Scout Master Thomas Hacker of
Illinois, who had well over 100 victims, and former Scout leader Franklin Mathias of
Oregon, who estimated that over thirty years he had 1100 sex acts with boys and
counted his victims at 242. Id.  at 32.  He had been named “Scouter of the Year” by
the Eastern Oregon District of the Boy Scouts in 1986. Id.
39 Exploited children are often unable to develop healthy relationships and show
severe dysfunctions later in life.  Jeffrey B. Bryer et al., Childhood Sexual and Physi-
cal Abuse as Factors in Adult Psychiatric Illness , 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1426, 1429
(1987); Ulrich C. Schoettle, Child Exploitation:  A Study of Child Pornography , 19 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 289, 296-98 (1980); Viens, supra  note 34, at 176 n.49
(2004) (“Additional ‘[l]ong-term effects of child sexual abuse can include . . . self-
destructiveness, anxiety, sleeping problems, eating disorders, disassociation, poor
self-esteem, trouble with interpersonal relationships, difficulty trusting others, vul-
nerability to revictimization later in life . . . and other problems with functioning
socially.’” (quoting Rebecca J. Whitcombe, Essay, Child Sexual Abuse:  Adult Survi-
vors, Repressed Memories, and Stories Finally Told , 11 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 255,
259-60 (2001))).
40 JOHN BRADSHAW, HEALING THE SHAME THAT BINDS YOU (1988); see also
Candice Feiring & Lynn S. Taska, The Persistence of Shame Following Sexual Abuse:
A Longitudinal Look at Risk and Recovery , 10 CHILD MALTREATMENT:  J. AM.
PROF’L SOC’Y ON ABUSE CHILD. 337, 337-47 (2005).
41 Ann W. Burgess et al., Abused to Abuser:  Antecedents of Socially Deviant Be-
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of becoming sexual abusers of children themselves, perpetuating
the cycle all over again.42
In order to merely survive the sexual abuse of a trusted figure
with personality intact, a child will don the “psychological ar-
mor” of emotional avoidance, denial, and repression to cope.
However, these coping mechanisms often cause the child not to
realize or experience the symptoms of the sexual abuse for many
years, until the symptoms are forced into plain view by therapy
or a “developmental trigger.”43
Until such a trigger arises, the victim of childhood sexual abuse
may unconsciously utilize denial to survive.  “Denial” is classified
as “the avoidance of awareness of some painful external reality
. . . accomplished by withholding conscious understanding of the
meaning and implications of what is perceived.”44  Stated more
succinctly, in order for the child victim to avoid mental break-
down, the defense mechanism of denial prohibits the conscious
mind from examining or integrating the acts of child abuse into
the child’s daily experience.  Or, more illustratively, the child’s
mind splits the abuse off from normal life and compartmentalizes
it.45  In that way, the child can continue to function in the pres-
haviors , 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1431, 1434-36 (1987); Sandrine Pirard et al., Ab-
stract, Prevalence of Physical and Sexual Abuse Among Substance Abuse Patients
and Impact on Treatment Outcomes , 78 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 57, 57
(2005), available at  http://www.sciencedirect.com (“More than half of substance
abusers entering addiction treatment report a history of physical or sexual abuse.”);
Schoettle, supra  note 39, at 296.
42 M. Glasser et al., Cycle of Child Sexual Abuse:  Links Between Being a Victim
and Becoming a Perpetrator,  179 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 482, 482-93 (2001); Theoharis
K. Seghorn et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse in the Lives of Sexually Aggressive Of-
fenders , 26 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 262, 262 (1987).
43 Rebecca L. Thomas, Note, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and
Statutes of Limitations:  A Call for Legislative Action , 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1245, 1254 (1991).
44 Id.  at n.74 (quoting Mardi J. Horowitz et al., A Classification Theory of De-
fense , in REPRESSION & DISASSOCIATION 60, 80 (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990)) (em-
phasis added).
45 Laura Johnson, Litigating Nightmares:  Repressed Memories of Childhood Sex-
ual Abuse , 51 S.C. L. REV. 939, 942 (2000) (“Sigmund Freud first proposed the
theory of a ‘defense mechanism that serves to repudiate or suppress emotions,
needs, feelings or intentions in order to prevent psychic “pain.”’” (quoting ELIZA-
BETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY:
FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 50 (1996))); see also
Viens, supra  note 34, at 180 (“Although victim memory repression adds to the wide-
spread unreporting and thus dearth of prosecution of childhood sexual abuse, the
more common causes of unreporting tend to be fear, shame, embarrassment, confu-
sion, denial, or some other psychological phenomenon which prevents the victim
from addressing their abuse.”).
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ence of a trusted abuser knowing that he has been sexually
abused and is likely to be abused again.
As with Fr. Tony and Stephen Connors, the typical civil suit
brought by adult survivors of child abuse is not usually based on
what would be called a forcible rape.  Often, a child turns to a
trusted adult for guidance and strength in a search for a father
figure.46  To seduce children, pedophiles use “grooming,” a pro-
gressive series of actions that operate on a continuum.  From the
outside, from the victim’s perspective, or even to the abuser’s
twisted mind, this can look very much like friendship, coaching,
youth pastoring, or Scout leadership.  For Fr. Tony, St. Peter’s
Guild and fishing were very convenient tools of grooming.  From
the innocuous grooming, which is often indistinguishable and un-
differentiated from the abuser’s appointed role, the abuser be-
gins to cross boundaries with the child, both professional and
physical.47  Often, the boundary violations start with giving the
child alcohol and then advance to a touch to the inner thigh or
perhaps a massage.  It is but a short step for an abuser to sexually
abuse the child.
After the abuse itself, the victims are frequently the last to
speak up.  As one author described it:
Childhood sexual abuse is the darkest of secrets, relegated
to silence through the most vile forms of trickery, threats and
abuse of trust.  Since the molester frequently is a role model or
46 Thomas, supra  note 43, at 1251 n.56 (“[G]reater  trauma has consistently been
documented from experiences involving fathers, father-figures or stepfathers.”).
47 DSM-IV-TR makes reference to the activity commonly known as “grooming”
as follows:
Others, particularly those who frequently victimize children, develop com-
plicated techniques for obtaining access to children, which may include
winning the trust of a child’s mother, marrying a woman with an attractive
child, [or] trading children with other individuals with Pedophilia . . . .
[T]he person may be attentive to the child’s needs in order to gain the
child’s affection, interest, and loyalty and to prevent the child from report-
ing the sexual activity.
DSM-IV-TR, supra  note 35, at 571.
For more on grooming, see BOYLE, supra  note 38, at 47-48; MARIE M. FORTUNE,
IS NOTHING SACRED:  WHEN SEX INVADES THE PASTORAL RELATIONSHIP (1989);
GLEN O. GABBORD, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
(1989); and PETER RUTTER, SEX IN THE FORBIDDEN ZONE:  WHEN MEN IN
POWER—THERAPISTS, DOCTORS, CLERGY, TEACHERS, AND OTHERS—BETRAY WO-
MEN’S TRUST (1989).  For grooming in the context of priests and their young charges,
see JASON BERRY, LEAD US NOT INTO TEMPTATION:  CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND THE
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (1992); A.W. RICHARD SIPE, SEX, PRIESTS, AND
POWER:  ANATOMY OF A CRISIS (1995); and VAN DAM, supra  note 37.
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other trusted figure . . . the child is reluctant to act contrary to
any demands placed upon her. . . . Thus, the child’s depen-
dency and innocence are abused to prevent recognition or rev-
elation of the abuse.  For many children trapped in the
netherworld of sexual abuse, revealing the secret is never an
option.48
In the mind of an abused child, there is simply no one to tell.
Indeed, it is not unusual for child abuse survivors to go de-
cades before confronting the compartmentalized abuse and its ef-
fect in their lives.49  According to the scientific literature, the
“triggering event” that allows the victim to deal with his abuse
can be varied, but typically it is a significant life event that causes
intense reflection or replicates the environment of the abuse.50
48 Thomas, supra  note 43, at 1250. R
49 See id.  at 1255 (“[O]ne study of 365 adult survivors found that, on the average,
survivors entered therapy 17 years  after the abuse terminated.”).  The overwhelming
weight of recent psychological research and scholarship on the discovery of child-
hood sexual abuse by its victims makes clear the substantial time generally required
by victims to come to grips with the abuse and to recognize its impact. See JOHN
CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED:  SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA
(1988); DAVID HECHLER, THE BATTLE AND THE BACKLASH:  THE CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE WAR (1988).
The Senate Judiciary Committee minutes contain the testimony of Jean Sherkoff,
psychotherapist, from Lutheran Family Services:  “Many victims are in their late 20’s
or early 30’s before they are able to identify [child sexual abuse] as a precursor to
the problems in their lives.” Hearings on H.B. 2668 Before the Senate Comm. on
Judiciary, 65th Or. Legis. Ass’y (May 24, 1989), Minutes at 251. See also id.  at Ex-
hibit “T” (testimony of Lorah Sebastian).
Often, experience shows, identifying sexual abuse as the source of one’s problems
may even occur in middle age. See Johnson, supra  note 45, at 942.  Additionally,
[t]he four stages of human memory are:  “encoding, consolidation, storage
and retrieval.”  “Repression is the ‘forcing of ideas, perceptions or memo-
ries associated with psychic trauma from conscious awareness into the un-
conscious.’”  While there is a consensus among psychiatric experts that
[repressed memory syndrome] is a legitimate medical condition, there is no
such consensus as to the incidence of RMS in patients.  Repression of
memories of abuse may provide the victims with short-term coping bene-
fits, however, the abuse may still result in emotional and psychological ef-
fects in the long-term.  Some victims of child sexual abuse who have
repressed memory of the abuse will live out the remainder of their lives
and never recall the abuse.  For many abuse victims, however, the memory
of their abuse will randomly resurface in their consciousness many years
later as a result of some “triggering mechanism.” . . . Aside from RMS,
victims employ various other “defense mechanisms to deal with the trauma
of the abuse, such as denial . . . and blocking out [of] a period of childhood,
a person, a place, or the more painful aspects of [the] abuse.”
Viens, supra  note 34, at 176-77 n.50 (citations omitted).
50 “The resurfacing of the victim’s repressed memory may be prompted by ‘a tele-
vision show on child sexual abuse, contact with an unrelated case of abuse, or exper-
iencing a scene similar to one associated with the repressed images.’”  Viens, supra
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All Stephen Connors needed to break open the secret was to see
Fr. Tony Rossi’s picture in the newspaper—forty years later.
Given the reality of a long delay in realizing harm from child
abuse, ORS 12.117 simply bows to the fact that that child abuse
victims have meritorious claims against their abusers and that
vulnerable, violated children do not come forward against a
trusted figure who sexually abuses them.  Instead the child com-
partmentalizes the abuse and tends to act out with drugs, sex, or
other risky behavior.  These behaviors begin a long road of
mental health problems that the victim, because of avoidance,
cannot connect with the abuse until well into adulthood.
Therefore, the “why” of using the extended statute of limita-
tions against a church boils down to the fact that a person func-
tioning at the emotional level of a child—no matter what age—
cannot then recognize the three requisite elements of tort, injury,
and causation.  As a result, more and more states have adopted
extended statutes of limitations for child abuse actions.51  And
perhaps not surprisingly—but a disappointment nonetheless—
the Roman Catholic Church is often at the forefront of opposi-
tion to such legislation.52
We have now seen the elements that create the background for
a classic case of priest sexual abuse illustrated here by Stephen’s
claims against the Johannines and the Archdiocese for the abuse
by Fr. Tony.  Furthermore, we have examined the reason for an
extended statute of limitations and the devastation that child-
hood sexual abuse wreaks in the lives of its victims.  Thus, we
may now turn to the many arguments made by the Church and
the many issues arising in these cases that center on questions of
religious freedom and burdens on religious practice.
note 34, at 177 n.50 (quoting Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping
Memories Lie?  Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases
of Memory Repression , 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 138 (1993)).  In addi-
tion to adult sexual activity, things such as a job promotion or the victim’s child
reaching the age at which the victim was abused have been noted as triggers.  Jasmin
v. Ross, 177 Or. App. 210, 212–13, 33 P.3d 725, 725-26 (2001) (recognition of injury
from abuse by step-uncle triggered by discussions with former high school confidant
approximately twelve years after the last incident of sexual contact); Thomas, supra
note 43, at 1254 n.78 (collecting cases).
51 See  Jorge L. Carro & Joseph V. Hatala, Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes
of Limitations and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases:  Have
We Gone Too Far? , 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1239, 1250 n.54 (1996) (listing statutes that
extend the statute of limitations for sexual abuse claims).
52 See  Chaput, supra  note 25.
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III
HOW IMPOSING LIABILITY ON CHURCHES CAN
IMPACT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Applying respondeat superior and negligence to the Church
for sex abuse of minors by the Church’s priests could arguably
have some impact on religious liberty.  Respondeat superior lia-
bility raises two significant concerns about a court imposing lia-
bility for a violation of the priestly relationship.  Likewise,
negligence also raises two religious liberty issues, which in both
cases results from the imposition of secular standards of care on
redemptive religious institutions.  The following discussion will
examine this impact and the specific concerns each doctrine can
create by imposing liability for the violation of a priest-
parishioner relationship
A. Respondeat Superior Liability and the Religious Liberty
Issues It Raises
As in other locales, respondeat superior liability in Oregon is
imposed without independent fault on a principal for torts of its
agents that occur in the course and scope of the agency or em-
ployment.  Under the Oregon Supreme Court case Chesterman v.
Barmon , there are three elements to the course and scope analy-
sis in Oregon:  the act (1) must occur in the time and space limits
of employment or agency; (2) must have been motivated, at least
in part, to serve the interests of the employer; and (3) must be of
a kind the employee or agent was authorized to perform.53
Typically, of course, intentional torts are not within the course
and scope of any job.54  Therefore, in the priest abuse context,
the Oregon Supreme Court has allowed juries to hold organiza-
53 305 Or. 439, 442, 753 P.2d 404, 406 (1988).  In Chesterman , an employer was
held liable for a sexual assault committed by one of its drivers as a result of the
driver taking a hallucinogenic drug to stay awake on the job. Id.  at 441, 753 P.2d at
405.
54 See  Fearing v. Bucher, 328 Or. 367, 375-76, 977 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1999).  In Fear-
ing , the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
[I]n the intentional tort context, it usually is inappropriate for the court to
base its decision regarding the adequacy of the complaint on whether the
complaint contains allegations that the intentional tort itself  was committed
in furtherance of any interest of the employer or was of the same kind of
activities that the employee was hired to perform.  Such circumstances
rarely will occur and are not, in any event, necessary to vicarious liability.
Rather, the focus properly is directed at whether the complaint contains
sufficient allegations . . . [that the priest’s] conduct that was within the scope
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tions liable for child sex abuse—which is by definition outside
the Chesterman  “scope of employment”—where the employee’s
authorized duties resulted in or were a causal factor in the
abuse.55  Without the job, the theory goes, the abuse would not
have occurred.  The “grooming” of a child abuse victim by an
adult who is in a position of trust is a typical precursor to abuse,
and many activities that constitute typical grooming behavior
(befriending, guidance, mentoring, education, etc.) are within the
recognized duties of a priest.  Thus, “a jury could infer that . . .
sexual assaults [by a priest] were the culmination of a progressive
series of actions that began with and continued to involve [the
priest’s] performance of the ordinary and authorized duties of a
priest.”56  In this way, churches are liable for sexual abuse by
priests because they employ and authorize priests to befriend
and care for children and teenagers.  And when these relation-
ships result in harm, the social risk analysis described above57
justifies holding a church vicariously liable.
Although the underlying abuse case is typically framed as a
battery action,58 a respondeat superior claim against the Church
can also just as appropriately be framed as a claim against the
priest for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.59
Either way, such respondeat superior liability claims raise relig-
ious liberty concerns at two points.  First, concerns arise at the
imposition of a kind of strict liability for abuse that was the result
of a religiously mandated trust relationship.  And second, relig-
ious liberties are at issue when defining the duties of a priest, that
is, asking a secular jury to determine what aspects of a trust rela-
of his employment . . . arguably resulted in the acts that caused plaintiff’s
injury .
Id.  (second emphasis added).
55 Id.  at 376, 977 P.2d at 1167 (Catholic Church); accord Lourim v. Swensen, 328
Or. 380, 388, 977 P.2d 1157, 1161 (1999) (Boy Scouts).
56 Fearing , 328 Or. at 375, 977 P.2d at 1167.
57 See  discussion supra Part I.B.
58 Battery in Oregon is defined as a nonconsensual or offensive touching.  Bakker
v. Baza’r, Inc., 275 Or. 245, 249, 551 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1976).
59 The following are the three elements of IIED in Oregon:
(1) that defendants intended to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress or
knew with substantial certainty that their conduct would cause such dis-
tress; (2) that defendants engaged in outrageous conduct—i.e. , conduct ex-
traordinarily beyond the bounds of socially tolerable behavior; and (3) that
defendants’ conduct in fact caused plaintiff severe emotional distress.
Checkley v. Boyd, 198 Or. App. 110, 124, 107 P.3d 651, 660 (citing McGanty v.
Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 543, 550, 901 P.2d 841, 852 (1995)), review denied , 383 Or.
583 (2005) .
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tionship were within the course and scope of a priest or other
religious employee.
1. Oregon’s Imposition of Strict Liability for a Trust
Relationship that Results in Sexual Abuse
Under Fearing v. Bucher  both the tortious acts themselves and
the precursor activities that result in the tort (i.e., grooming) are
analyzed in the course and scope analysis.  Religious liberty con-
cerns are therefore implicated, the argument goes, because secu-
lar respondeat superior law improperly assigns liability to what
are normally considered religious, priestly functions of a facially
nontortious nature.  Or at least that is how the Church sees it.
As one defense counsel quipped in summary judgment briefing,
Fearing  created “the tort of getting to know you.”60
However, styling respondeat superior liability in the priest
abuse context as “the tort of getting to know you” is obvious
hyperbole.  An adult’s grooming of a child within a trust relation-
ship is a typical precursor to abuse, and typical grooming behav-
ior—from the perspective of the child— looks very like the
recognized duties of a priest (i.e., befriend, guide, mentor, and
educate).  The Church’s liability attaches to the priest’s grooming
behavior only when it results in sexual abuse of the child.  There
is no “tort of getting to know you”—a tort only accrues when a
priest uses the trust relationship to abuse a child.  Because the
position of trust is central to the employment of priests, and be-
cause the manipulation of the trust relationship is how the priest
is able to molest a child, the Fearing  theory creates no special
imposition on religious belief or practice.  Liability would be no
different in the case of, say, the drunken driving of a bus driver
who was in the scope of his job driving kids home.61
In response to Fearing-style liability, the Church has some-
times argued that imposition of respondeat superior for priestly
actions that result in sexual abuse places a burden on the free
60 Archdiocese Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Response
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 30-31, D.A. v. Archdiocese of
Portland, No. 0107-07465 (Multnomah County Cir. Ct. Jan. 22, 2002).
61 For instance, there is no argument that the Church would be liable for a priest
who molested a child he found by chance on a playground with no trust relationship
preceding the abuse—say the child did not even know this was a priest.  The Church
is not responsible for every tortious action of its priests but only, under Fearing , for
those that arise from the trust relationship sponsored by the Church. See 328 Or. at
377, 977 P.2d at 1168 (1999).
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exercise of religion by making such priestly interactions subject
to secular scrutiny.  When first raising this defense in the winter
of 1999 to 2000, the Archdiocese of Portland suggested that strict
scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner62  should be applied to the im-
position of respondeat superior under Oregon law.63
But closer inspection showed that the proper test for Free Ex-
ercise challenges to state law was found in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith ,64 and
under that standard, the Church would have to demonstrate a
Free Exercise burden coupled with a second “hybrid” right in
order to trigger strict scrutiny.65  Yet even under such strict scru-
tiny, it is a difficult argument to assert that the case-by-case im-
position of respondeat superior liability is somehow not narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling government interest of pro-
tecting children from abuse.66  Even assuming a significant bur-
den on religious practice, imposition of liability would be wholly
dependent on the facts of a particular priest’s abuse of a particu-
lar child.
In fact, the laws that have failed to meet Free Exercise strict
scrutiny have been those that have applied a specific rule without
flexibility for particular holy days,67 child rearing methods,68 or
62 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
63 The enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the
subsequent Supreme Court invalidation of RFRA with respect to state laws oc-
curred prior to the filing of these motions, so there was little merit to the contention
that RFRA had reestablished the strict scrutiny test in the realm of state law. See
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
64 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990) (holding that facially neutral, generally applicable
laws that incidentally implicate religious beliefs are valid unless religious activity is
paired with another independent constitutional right).
65 Id.  at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amend-
ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections . . . .”); see also discus-
sion supra  Part III.A.
66 The compelling interest test is comprised of three basic elements:  a law that
imposes (1) a substantial burden on religious practice (2) must be narrowly tailored
(3) to serve a compelling government interest. See, e.g. , Sherbert , 374 U.S. at 403-
09.
67 Id.  at 409-10.
68 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (invalidating compulsory
school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious
grounds to send their children to school).
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proselytizing methods.69  Given this case law, a jury’s ad hoc ex-
amination of an individual priest’s behavior would seem the most
narrow way in which one could further the governmental or soci-
etal interest in providing restitution through the civil justice sys-
tem for child abuse victims of clergy.  Indeed, through
deliberation juries could decide whether that particular priest
was motivated at least in part to serve the Archdiocese within the
course and scope of his employment.
Despite the Church’s objections, the imposition of respondeat
superior liability on religious activity is a reasonable response to
the reality of priest sexual abuse of children for several reasons.
First, the Church is on balance better equipped to deal with se-
lection, training, and supervision of its priests.  Indeed, the
Church makes boys and men into priests.  Second, by perpetuat-
ing the institution of the priesthood and by establishing doctrines
that make the priest in personam Christi , the Church places
priests in a position of ultimate trust and authority over parishio-
ners.  In particular, children, with their absolute faith and trust,
are strongly conditioned to obey priests.
Third, and most centrally, allowing the Church to accept these
benefits while washing their hands of malefactors would be
plainly unjust.  Undoubtedly there is something to Dr. Thomas
Baty’s and Judge Posner’s observation that respondeat superior
follows so-called deep pockets.70  But this is not so much purely
mercenary as it is a recognition that it is preferable for an institu-
tion with significant assets and ongoing goodwill to provide re-
dress for profound and lasting injury to a child, rather than
leaving the child emotionally broken and without resources or
restitution.  In the bus driver scenario, even though the driver
was not supposed to drink while driving, how unjust would it be
for the Church not to be financially responsible for the damages
incurred by the injured school children?
Beyond that—and often forgotten in such discussions—a
plaintiff must still convince a jury of his peers that it is just under
all the circumstances to impose liability on the Church when, by
69 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-14 (1943) (invalidating a flat
tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system for relig-
ious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to
deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious).
70 BATY, supra  note 10; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 6.8, at 204-05 (5th ed. 1998).
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definition, the Church hierarchy itself did nothing wrong. Fear-
ing is not actually strict  liability.  The ultimate gatekeepers of jus-
tice are a jury.  If the result of an award is unjust in a particular
case, let the Church so argue, and let us remember that a jury is
in a perfect position to correct any such injustice.  That is what
we trust juries to do.
2. The Problem of Defining the Duties of a Priest
The other religious liberty challenge to imposing respondeat
superior liability stems from the Chesterman  analysis of course
and scope.71  Specifically, how does one ask a secular jury to de-
termine what actions are in the “time and space limits” of em-
ployment and what actions are “of a kind the [priest] was hired
to perform”?72  The Church has argued that for a secular court or
jury to define what is and is not included in the duties of a priest
necessarily implicates the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention
and thereby runs afoul of the First Amendment.73  At first blush,
this argument would seem to carry some weight in that a court is
being called on to determine if a priest’s actions conformed to his
religious obligations, which in turn obviously requires an exami-
nation into the tenets of a religion.  This is getting into admit-
tedly delicate territory for anyone who values religious freedom.
And yet, courts have never been required totally to abstain from
cases where religious tenets are merely involved so long as the
court does not adjudicate the correctness or orthodoxy of relig-
ious belief or practice.
Ecclesiastical abstention is a well-established doctrine, but it
would be misapplied if used to shield the Church from civil tort
liability in the priest abuse cases.  The religious autonomy or ec-
clesiastical abstention doctrine under the First Amendment as-
serts that secular courts should not resolve disputes about
religious dogma or custom.74  But the universal rule, including
71 See supra  note 53 and accompanying text.
72 Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or. 439, 442, 753 P.2d 404, 406 (1988) (describing
requirements necessary to conclude that an employee was acting within the scope of
employment).
73 The use of the abstention doctrine is typified in the case of Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich .  426 U.S. 696 (1976). Milivojevich  recognized
that secular courts cannot determine who is the proper bishop in a diocese where the
contending successors to the seat are disputing the other’s claim by resorting to
church law. Id.  at 712-13. See discussion infra  Part III.B.
74 See, e.g. , Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 720 (refusing to determine who is proper
bishop); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
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the rule in Oregon, is that courts may exercise jurisdiction over
religious bodies in secular matters, including tort cases.75  Nearly
every other jurisdiction has refused to exempt religious institu-
tions from liability for torts by clergy on abstention grounds.76
Nothing in case law would suggest that respondeat superior lia-
bility or negligence of a Church should be exempt from judicial
inquiry because of abstention considerations.  Indeed, the eccle-
siastical abstention doctrine springs from sound notions of
nonentanglement, not noninvolvement .  And a court’s obser-
vance or recognition of a priest’s Church-defined duties (as op-
posed to an interpretation or definition of these duties) in no way
places the state’s imprimatur on religious practice.77
A suit claiming sexual abuse of a child does not require a court
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (refusing to say which group in split denomination
is rightful owner of property).
75 See Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203, 241,
644 P.2d 577, 601, review denied , 293 Or. 456 (1982) (“[A] religious organization,
merely because it is such, is not shielded by the First Amendment from all liability
for [the tort of] fraud.”).
76 See Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 76-77 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding that the
religious autonomy doctrine and First Amendment jurisprudence do not require dis-
missal of sexual assault charges against clergy); id.  at 77 (“[T]he First Amendment
[only] prohibits judicial interference with internal church matters that require an
interpretation of religious doctrine.”); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320
(Colo. 1993) (“Application of a secular standard to secular conduct that is tortious is
not prohibited by the Constitution.”); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Dioce-
san Corp., 716 A.2d 967, 970 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (“[D]etermination of . . . negli-
gent supervision . . . would not prejudice or impose upon any of the religious tenets
or practices of Catholicism.”); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997)
(“Religious conduct intended or certain to cause harm need not be tolerated under
the First Amendment.”); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654
N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (App. Div. 1997) (“The First Amendment does not grant religious
organizations absolute immunity from tort liability.”); C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic
Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 277 (Wash. 1999) (“The First Amendment does not
provide churches with absolute immunity to engage in tortious conduct.  So long as
liability is predicated on secular conduct and does not involve the interpretation of
church doctrine or religious beliefs, it does not offend constitutional principles.”);
cf. , Presbyterian Church , 393 U.S. at 449 (“Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of
religion merely by opening their doors to [secular] disputes involving church prop-
erty.”).  However, because an examination of the obligation a priest owes to his
penitents may involve doctrinal questions, one court was reluctant to define the fidu-
ciary duties of a priest. See H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98-99 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
77 See  Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharps-
burg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970) (holding that applying “state statutory law
governing the holding of property by religious corporations, . . . language in the
deeds conveying the properties[,] . . . the terms of the charters of the corporations,
and [the] provisions in the constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the
ownership and control of church property” was constitutionally acceptable, because
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to decide whether a Church departed from the true faith, as in
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Pres-
byterian Church ,78 nor which faction represents the true apos-
tolic succession, as in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich .79  Indeed, an evaluation of the direct supervision of
priests has been found to be within the ambit of the courts.80  For
example, in Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp. , the court treated “religious principles as facts” in trying a
fiduciary duty claim.81  To be sure, “looking at” religious duties is
not the same as “interfering in,”82 or interpreting83 religious be-
lief.  And imposing liability because the sexual conduct resulted
from the precursor activity is not imposing liability for that
activity.
Additionally, it would seem from case law that the ecclesiasti-
cal abstention approach to resolving disputes involving religious
parties requires religious disputants on both sides.84  Child abuse
plaintiffs are typically not disputing the propriety of any religious
decision nor challenging whether the Church acted in accordance
with the victim’s interpretation of Roman Catholicism.  In fact,
the Ninth Circuit has noted that the ecclesiastical abstention doc-
“resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into religious doctrine” (citations
omitted)).
78 393 U.S. at 449-50.
79 426 U.S. at 709-10.
80 Gray v. Ward, 950 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. 1997).  Also, according to the Second
Circuit:
Where a person’s beliefs . . . give rise to a special legal relationship between
him and his church, we may be required to consider with other relevant
evidence the nature of that person’s beliefs . . . . In doing so, we judge
nothing to be heresy, support no dogma, and acknowledge no beliefs or
practices of any sect to be the law.
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 431 (2d Cir.
1999).
81 196 F.3d at 431.
82 Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 7, 692 A.2d 441,
443.
83 Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 76-77 (D.R.I. 1997).
84 See, e.g. , Little v. First Baptist Church, 475 U.S. 1148, 1148-49 (1986) (pastor
seeking to be retained); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979) (church members
fighting over church property); Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 704 (bishop demanding rec-
ognition from church body); Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church
of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 (1970) (hierarchical organization
seeking to retain church property from breakaway churches); Presbyterian Church
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-452
(1969) (same); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 681-83 (1872) (groups of
parishioners fighting over ownership of church property).
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trine does not apply in parishioner-church tort suits.85
Certainly, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine can apply in
parishioner discipline cases.  However, these are parishioners
who have consented to abide by the defendant’s policies.  Unlike
the cases where parishioners protest “shunning,”86 “marking,”87
or excommunication,88 child abuse plaintiffs do not object to the
operation of church law or discipline on themselves.89  Minor pa-
rishioners cannot be said to assume the risk of sexual abuse by
pedophile priests through their consent to being members of the
Church in the way parishioners consent to the threat of
excommunication.
Recently, one state supreme court went so far as to order a
church election on the retention of a pastor so long as it followed
the church’s own internal procedures.90  Because a child abuse
victim is not disputing what the proper role or duties of a priest
should be  as a matter of religious doctrine, the ecclesiastical ab-
stention doctrine does not block Oregon’s respondeat superior
liability in the priest abuse context.  Child abuse victims essen-
tially tell a jury that, accepting the religious documents of the
Church at face value, the duties of a priest include the kind of
85 The Ninth Circuit has stated:
Ecclesiastical abstention thus provides that civil courts may not redeter-
mine the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision
relating to government of the religious polity.  Rather, we must accept as a
given whatever the entity decides. . . .
This limited abstention doctrine is not relevant here because [the plaintiff]
is not alleging that the new rules governing disassociation are improper
under Church law. . . . Nor does she seek relief for having been “wrongfully”
disfellowshiped.  Rather, she seeks relief for the harms she has suffered as
a result of conduct engaged in by the Jehovah’s Witnesses that is presuma-
bly consistent with the governing law of the Church. Accordingly, the doc-
trine of Serbian Orthodox Diocese does not apply .
Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 878 n.1 (9th Cir.
1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
86 Id.  at 876.
87 “Marking” is the public disclosure of intimately revealed transgressions.
Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978, 980-81 (Okla. 1992); see also  Smith v. Calvary Chris-
tian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 591 (Mich. 2000).
88 O’Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361, 362 (Haw. 1994).
89 See Paul , 819 F.2d at 883 (“Churches are afforded great latitude when they
impose discipline on members or former members.”).  But see  Bear v. Reformed
Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 107-08 (Pa. 1975) (refusing to dismiss case be-
cause “shunning” might cause excessive interference with marital and familial rela-
tions and operation of business).
90 Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church v. Wallace, 2002-CA-00070-SCT (¶ 11)
(Miss. 2003).
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trust relationship that can be used and was used for grooming
purposes.  When that behavior does result in molestation of a
child, the secular, religiously neutral standard of respondeat su-
perior liability will apply.
B. Negligence, the Use of Secular Standards of Care for
Redemptive Institutions, and the Problems with
Asking How the Church Got Its Information
A negligence claim in Oregon must include the following
elements:
(1) that defendant’s conduct caused a foreseeable risk of
harm, (2) that the risk is to an interest of a kind that the law
protects against negligent invasion, (3) that defendant’s con-
duct was unreasonable in light of the risk, (4) that the conduct
was a cause of plaintiff’s harm, and (5) that plaintiff was within
the class of persons and plaintiff’s injury was within the gen-
eral type of potential incidents and injuries that made defen-
dant’s conduct negligent.91
Thus in Oregon, foreseeability takes the place of the more
traditional common law duty of care.  Beyond that, if the plaintiff
invokes a special status, relationship, or standard of conduct
unique to the defendant, then that relationship may create, de-
fine, or limit the defendant’s actual duty to the plaintiff.92
In priest abuse cases, the arguments for finding negligence are
twofold.  First, additional instances of abuse are reasonably fore-
seeable when a particular person or priest offends once.  Second,
the trust relationship between the Church and its child parishio-
ners serves to define a duty of the Church either to remove such
persons from positions involving children or to provide clear
warnings to parishioners and strict oversight of the priests in any
potentially dangerous reassignment.
Turning now to a discussion of religious liberty issues in the
context of negligence, a brief survey reveals that they are several,
subtle, and interesting:
1.  The question of whether Church members may in some
sense be said to have waived secular standards of reasonable con-
duct in light of Church membership, as some Church lawyers
have argued;
91 Solberg v. Johnson, 306 Or. 484, 490-91, 760 P.2d 867, 870 (1988).
92 Or. Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P., 336 Or. 329, 340-41, 83 P.3d
322, 328 (2004).
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2.  The question of whether a secular jury should decide stan-
dards of reasonable conduct when such conduct may have been
driven by religious belief;
3.  The many questions arising from an inquiry into how the
Church hierarchy knows what it knows about a particular troub-
lesome priest and whether such knowledge can be rightly consid-
ered confidential; and
4.  The question of whether punitive damages are a violation of
religious liberty because of their potential to cause serious eco-
nomic damage to the Church and its charitable mission.
For in the intersection of civil liability and religious belief, the
devil—to borrow a metaphor—is in the details.  At least so the
Church would argue.  And yet, even in the trenches of civil litiga-
tion, an appropriate respect for the claims of religious practice
need not prevent the search for justice from going forward if the
issues are properly understood and framed.
1. Waiver of the Secular Standard of Care by Membership in a
Religious Organization
On occasion, the Church has attempted to argue that because
parishioners were members of the Church as an institution, they
in essence consented to Church practice concerning the absolute
authority of bishops to assign, discipline, and remove priests.93
In a sense, the argument is that the victims, or their families,
were not really third persons but were, in fact, part of the defen-
dant Church.  Therefore they can be said to have waived the
right to complain about decisions that were made by the Church.
Conceptually, this idea is the exact opposite of a special duty of
care imposed on a church that invites the participation and mem-
bership of minors and their families.
93 For example, the Archdiocese of Portland made this troubling argument within
the context of its bankruptcy case, attempting to persuade the court that the “church
autonomy doctrine” barred that court from applying civil law to issues the Archdio-
cese argued were controlled by canon law.  Debtor’s Reply Brief in Support of its
Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, In re  Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Portland, 335 B.R. 815 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (No. 04-37154-elp11, Adv. Proc. No. 04-
03292-elp).  As support, the Archdiocese argued that the tort claimants were in the
wrong venue—that their claims did not belong in a secular court because they had
“impliedly consented to Catholic Church Doctrine or polity,” pointing out that “at
the time of their alleged sexual misconduct, [tort claimants] were members of or
associated with the Roman Catholic Church, primarily through attendance at a
Catholic school and/or parish church within the Archdiocese.” Id.  at 11 (quoting
Second Declaration of Margaret Hoffmann).
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To impose a secular standard on the Church in light of these
accepted tenets, the Church argues, would be to ignore the con-
scious decision made by parishioners to abide by Church rules,
which in essence is a waiver.  This argument, if serious, has nu-
merous problems.  First, it is basic law that any waiver must be
knowing.94  It would be hard to find a Catholic family anywhere,
anytime, that would say they understood that, by joining the
Church, they were waiving any legal claims that might arise from
wrongdoing by Church officials against their children.  Indeed,
this argument is similar to the protections that Native American
tribes, enjoying sovereign immunity, make concerning injuries
arising on tribal land:  you cannot bring suit because you were
here voluntarily.  The only difference being that the Roman
Catholic Church has no such sovereign immunity, at least in the
United States.95
Second, the argument would need to be applied to the vic-
tim—obviously a minor at the time of the abuse.  It is nonsensical
to argue that a child who was not old enough as a matter of law
to consent to sexual activity was competent enough to waive le-
gal rights.  Perhaps such arguments will prove to be one-time
trial balloons made in the desperation of a bankruptcy case
rather than considered positions of the Church.
2. Application of the Foreseeability/Duty of Care Standard
The application of the foreseeability standard under Oregon’s
rule of negligence might be problematic for religious liberty in
94 In re  Marriage of Woods, 207 Or. App. 452, 460, 142 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2006)
(“[A]dults with the capacity to do so generally are free to waive a panoply of rights,
statutory and constitutional, so long as the waiver is knowing and intentional.” (cit-
ing In re Marriage of McInnis, 199 Or. App. 223, 236, 110 P.3d 639, 645 (2005))); DK
Inv. Co. v. Inter-Pacific Dev. Co., 195 Or. App. 256, 263, 97 P.3d 675, 679-80 (2004).
95 The individual dioceses and archdioceses have no claim to sovereign status.
The Holy See, the political manifestation of the Vatican, does possess sovereign im-
munity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).  28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-
1611 (2000). Cf. Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 390-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (outlin-
ing FSIA exceptions in section 1605 relating to commercial activities, taking of prop-
erty, and noncommercial torts involving the sovereign as a party); Rios v. Marshall,
530 F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that under the FSIA, “foreign states
are granted immunity from the jurisdiction of courts of this nation with respect to
their public or governmental acts but not with respect to their commercial acts”).
However, Judge Michael Mosman of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon ruled on June 7, 2006, that the Holy See was subject to suit under the
FSIA commercial activities exception. See  Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925,
947 (D. Or. 2006).
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several ways.  First, as a general matter, it is important to remem-
ber that the requirement of foreseeability does not mean a defen-
dant must have actually foreseen the risk of danger.96  Rather, a
plaintiff can still succeed so long as he or she proves that the
defendant should have known of the risk; that is, a reasonable
person would have foreseen the risk.  However, when applied to
a bishop who, for example, transferred a subordinate clergyman
who had confessed and repented of inappropriate sexual conduct
with a child, the issue of whether a reasonable individual would
have foreseen that risk becomes more difficult.
A reasonable secular person in the year 2006 (i.e., one who has
read newspapers for at least five years and believes that child
molesters are often habitual offenders with a low probability of
reform) would undoubtedly foresee a risk once warned about
such a priest’s tendencies.  But, for example, a clergyman in 1966
and steeped in religious doctrine that teaches repentance, for-
giveness, and reform through a transformative divine grace,
might reasonably have believed that the abusing clergyman will
not reoffend because he has genuinely repented and been trans-
formed.  Fr. Dubois, it will be remembered, genuinely believed in
change:  he had himself been changed, and he believed Fr. Tony
would be as well.  Asking a secular jury to judge and evaluate
this belief as reasonable or not has significant implications for
religious liberty.  The effect of such a ruling is to assume that the
reasonable person is always secular, or worse, that the perspec-
tive of the devout religious belief is per se unreasonable.
This problematic implication of the foreseeability standard
also arises under the third element of negligence in Oregon:  the
defendant’s conduct was unreasonable in light of the risk.  In the
case of the transfer of a dangerous priest, the argument can be
made that, even upon awareness of the risk, a reasonable clergy-
man might (based on his faith) take action to safeguard against
the risk, yet that action could be insufficient in the eyes of the
law’s reasonable person.  Fr. Dubois or the Bishop might believe
that through regular confession, accountability, and prayer Fr.
Tony will be able to deal with his problem.  However, these safe-
guards that Fr. Dubois or the Bishop believed reasonable may
96 This analysis does not consider the implications of ORS 12.117’s requirement
that only actual knowledge will trigger the extension of time to file suit. See OR.
REV. STAT. § 12.117(1) (2005).
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well be insufficient under the watchful eyes of a civil jury apply-
ing the law’s presumptively secular reasonable person standard.
The reasonableness standard applied to the conduct of the de-
fendant might even require or suggest conduct that would be
against Church teaching.  For example, while a warning letter to
parishioners might in some circumstances be required before a
transfer under the secular reasonableness standard, it runs
counter to the idea that a priest is a representative of Christ.  As
one bishop said in a deposition, he did not warn parishioners
about a particular priest’s past problems with children, because
he feared the disclosure would harm the priest’s reputation and
hinder his effectiveness in ministry.97
True, a bishop might be able to arrive at solutions to the prob-
lem that are both secularly reasonable and consistent with
Church doctrine.  However, the point is that there are situations
in which such a harmonious balance cannot be struck.  In such
situations a jury might expect that the bishop would subordinate
sacraments, selection and assignment of clergy,98 and fundamen-
tal doctrines of the faith (e.g., repentance, forgiveness, redemp-
tion, sanctification) to the needs of the situation.
But even so, the fundamental question remains:  to what de-
gree  may the law inhibit the exercise of such beliefs from un-
abashedly impacting innocent third parties, even children?
Remembering that no civil right is absolute, the standard answer
for why such restrictions are constitutional is that “foreseeabil-
ity,” and by implication “reasonableness,” is a basic element of a
generally applicable tort law.  And since foreseeability and rea-
sonableness are neutrally applied, it survives constitutional re-
view under the Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith99  test for the Free Exercise
97 The deposition was sealed by Court Order and therefore cannot be quoted or
cited.
98 See Schwartz & Lorber, supra  note 22.
99 The Supreme Court stated in Smith :
It is a permissible reading of the [Free Exercise Clause] . . . to say that if
prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.
. . . .
. . . To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent
upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State’s interest is “compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs,
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Clause.100
Courts have found that judicial review of negligence in em-
ployment decisions does not require looking into the subjective
reasons for the decisions.  Rather, it requires application of the
more neutral concept of foreseeability, and as such, religious
doctrine per se is not implicated.101  While there are circum-
stances under which free exercise should not be impinged
upon,102 it can and should be that such burdens are justified
when an overriding societal need is at issue, such as the protec-
tion of children or providing access to civil justice when children
“to become a law unto himself,” contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense.
494 U.S. 872, 878, 885 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1879)).
100 Cf.  Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 363-64 (Fla. 2002)  Also, one law review
article stated:
In Malicki , the respondents, a minor male and an adult female, brought
suit against the Archdiocese of Miami, asserting that the Diocese’s negli-
gent hiring and supervision of a sexually abusive priest was the cause of
their injuries.  The Church sought dismissal of the claims, citing First
Amendment religion protection.  The court reasoned that allowing the
claims to go forward would not violate the Free Exercise Clause because
the generally applicable tort law was being neutrally applied.  Furthermore,
the court determined that adjudication of the claims would not involve ex-
cessive entanglement such as would violate the Establishment Clause.  The
court therefore concluded that the claims were not barred by the First
Amendment.
Michael J. Sartor, Note, Respondeat Superior, Intentional Torts, and Clergy Sexual
Misconduct:  The Implications of  Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687,
698 n.53 (2005) (citations omitted).
101 According to Jana Satz Nugent:
[C]laims based on negligence turn on the reasonable foreseeability of the
cleric’s misconduct and not on the religious institution’s reasons for hiring
or firing the cleric.  Since the question of foreseeability does not implicate
religious doctrine, the court found judicial scrutiny consistent with the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Janna Satz Nugent, Note, A Higher Authority:  The Viability of Third Party Tort Ac-
tions Against a Religious Institution Grounded on Sexual Misconduct by a Member of
the Clergy, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 982 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
102 One Florida court stated:
[W]e are persuaded that just as the State may prevent a church from offer-
ing human sacrifices, it may protect its children against injuries caused by
pedophiles by authorizing civil damages against a church that knowingly
. . . creates a situation in which such injuries are likely to occur.  We recog-
nize that the State’s interest must be compelling indeed in order to inter-
fere in the church’s selection, training and assignment of its clerics.  We
would draw the line at criminal conduct.
Doe v. Dorsey, 683 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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are harmed.103
An interesting question is whether one could obtain strict scru-
tiny review under the Smith  standard by arguing that the foresee-
ability standard is not  neutral law, but rather inherently biased
against religious belief by presuming that only a secular perspec-
tive is reasonable.  In other words, if a person makes an assess-
ment of the risk in a situation based on a sincerely held religious
belief (e.g., giving a priest a second chance because one believes
that he has been reformed through the intervention of God
through a sacrament), is that belief inherently unreasonable
under the law?  Thus, while negligence can operate against the
Church so long as it is neutral and generally applicable, an argu-
ment could be made that the particular standard  of foreseeability
under the law of Oregon is biased against religion.  Of course,
this too, like the previous discussion about the efficacy of juries,
ignores the fact that it will always be a jury—made up, presuma-
bly, of a cross-section of the community, including people of re-
ligious faith—that makes the determination as to what is
reasonable.  Again, we ask juries to make these kinds of subjec-
tive decisions all the time.  It seems not a stretch, and certainly
no infringement on religious liberty, for a jury to decide whether
a particular decision, even made for religious reasons, was unrea-
sonable under the circumstances.
C. Confidentiality:  The Issues of Religious Liberty that Arise
from the Confessional, Sub-Secreto Files, and Medical
and Psychological Records
Oregon’s clergy-penitent privilege is quite broad and contains
no explicit limiting language regarding when a discussion involv-
ing a clergy member is not privileged.104  It comes into play gen-
erally to protect any communication between bishops and
103 According to Nugent:
Even if the behavior is religiously based, neutral laws of general applica-
tion do not violate the First Amendment.  But “[a] law failing to satisfy
these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest”; the court will ap-
ply strict scrutiny to determine whether the law violates the First Amend-
ment.  Consequently, if the conduct being regulated is religiously based,
the court must identify the law’s purpose and function.
Nugent, supra  note 101, at 973 (2003) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32, 546 (1993)) (footnotes omitted).
104 Codified in ORS 40.260, the privilege reads in relevant part:
(1)(a) “Confidential communication” means a communication made pri-
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priests, including discussions concerning investigations or disci-
pline.  It also operates in two secondary ways:  (1) to protect the
church’s secret personnel files on priests when sought in discov-
ery, and (2) to protect the records of an abusive priest’s psycho-
logical counseling that are given to and retained by the Church.
1. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege Generally
The clergy-penitent privilege has been summarized as “em-
bracing any ‘confession by a penitent to a minister in his capacity
as such to obtain such spiritual aid as was sought and held out in
this instance’”105  The Church has used this privilege to argue
that virtually all communications between a bishop and abusive
priests or those priests who witness clergy abuse by their peers
are confidential and protected from discovery.106  However, Ore-
gon’s clergy-penitent privilege does not sweep nearly so broadly.
vately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons pre-
sent in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
(1)(b) “Member of the clergy” means a minister of any church . . . who in
the course of the discipline or practice of that church . . . is authorized or
accustomed to hearing confidential communications and, under the disci-
pline or tenets of that church . . . has a duty to keep such communications
secret.
(2) A member of the clergy may not be examined as to any confidential
communication made to the member of the clergy in the member’s profes-
sional character unless consent to the disclosure of the confidential com-
munication is given by the person who made the communication.
(3) Even though the person who made the communication has given con-
sent to the disclosure, a member of the clergy may not be examined as to
any confidential communication made to the member in the member’s pro-
fessional character if, under the discipline or tenets of the member’s
church, denomination or organization, the member has an absolute duty to
keep the communication confidential.
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (2005).
105 Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Mullen
v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
106 In a memorandum opinion, one bankruptcy court for the District of Oregon
stated:
Archbishop Levada also seeks a ruling that he is entitled to raise numer-
ous privilege objections, including objections based on Oregon’s clerical
privilege . . . .
. . . [The court has] rejected the argument that Oregon’s privilege for
communications with clergy, set forth in OEC 506(2), applies to all confi-
dential communications with clergy.  The rule requires that the communi-
cation with clergy be “in the [clergy] member’s professional character,”
which I interpret to mean in his role as spiritual advisor.
In re  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. 815, 836 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005).
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Plainly, Oregon’s privilege was not designed to be limited to
communications in the Roman Catholic sacrament of reconcilia-
tion, otherwise known as confession.107  Its terms are much more
generous.  While State v. Cox108  is the only Oregon case applying
the privilege in significant detail, other state courts have applied
it under circumstances involving allegations of sexual abuse.109
Undoubtedly confidential communications that fall within the
scope of Oregon’s clergy-penitent privilege are made in the
course of any priest’s duties.  No one in any civil abuse case on
record in Oregon, as far as is known, has argued that the very
central and, to Catholics, sacred rites of the confessional should
be subject to discovery in abuse cases.  However, not all commu-
nications to or from a priest are protected by the clergy-penitent
privilege, and no communications about a priest to other church
employees or agents, such as mental health workers, are pro-
tected since only confidential, spiritual communications are pro-
tected by the privilege.  In the bankruptcy case involving the
Archdiocese of Portland, an issue arose about deposing a former
Archbishop now on assignment at the Vatican.  Lawyers for the
bishop argued fiercely—reading the privilege most broadly—that
many questionable areas should be off-limits.110  Not surpris-
ingly, these arguments were rejected by the court in favor of a
more commonsense reading of the privilege.
2. Sub-Secreto Files
Priest discipline files are held in confidential files, usually lo-
cated in a separate area from the rest of Church records.  The
keeping of these files is mandated by Canon Law111 and is driven
by a concern that delicate details of a priest’s life, problems, and
medical issues should not be on display to any secretary or
janitor who happens to stumble onto regular personnel files.
107 See  State v. Cox, 87 Or. App. 443, 445-48, 742 P.2d 694, 695-97 (1987) (holding
that admission of Mormon clergyman’s testimony about defendant’s confession vio-
lated clergy-penitent privilege and required reversal of defendant’s conviction).
108 Id.
109 See, e.g. , People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
110 See  Archbishop Levada’s Reply to Tort Claimant’s Response to Motion to
Modify Subpoena, In re  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland,  335 B.R. 815
(Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (raising arguments that the requested discovery was barred by:
(1) the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, (2) the Doctrine of Comity, (3) the Law
of the Holy See as Applicable under Oregon Choice-of-Law rules, (4) Oregon’s cler-
ical privilege, and (5) federal governmental privilege).
111 See supra  note 14.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 45 15-MAR-07 8:06
2006] The Intersection of Religious Freedom and Civil Liability 525
However, over time, these sub-secreto files have come to be a
place where the Church administrators would put information
about accusations of misconduct against a priest out of a stated
concern that the material could cause scandal.112  Eventually, the
Church began to refuse to release these sub-secreto files in dis-
covery, claiming they were privileged under the clergy-penitent
privilege.113
Yet the personnel records of a tortfeasor, whether clerical or
layperson, are absolutely within the scope of discovery in civil
litigation in Oregon.114  And the right to discovery in Oregon is
broad and liberally construed.115  Indeed, the Oregon Supreme
Court directs trial courts to be liberal in compelling inspection of
nonprivileged documents.116  No privacy privilege—certainly no
112 This use of the diocesan secret archives to hide accusations of priest abuse is
arguably a distortion of the bishops’ power to “determine that other materials or
documents be stored [in the secret archives] because of their sensitive or secret na-
ture or because dissemination or revelation of them could seriously damage an indi-
vidual’s reputation or cause scandal within the community.” BEAL ET AL., supra
note 14, at 643 (footnotes omitted).
113 See  Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d
209, 226 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 311-12 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004)) (holding that Catholic diocese must comply with government sub-
poena in sexual assault prosecution against priest, even if Canon 489 requires bishop
to maintain secret archive for files relating to internal Church discipline); Soc’y of
Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 808 N.E.2d 272, 279-80 (Mass. 2004)
(holding that state could subpoena personnel file of priest charged with sexual as-
sault even if such disclosure would inhibit “communications that are necessary to
maintain the Jesuits’ relationship with one of its own priests”); Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 201-02 (Pa. 1997) (holding that criminal defendant’s compel-
ling interest in fair trial outweighed Catholic diocese’s claim to withhold documents
deemed confidential under Canon Law because “the burden on the Diocese’s relig-
ious freedom furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive
means available”).
114 The Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP) provide:
For all forms of discovery, parties may inquire regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the exis-
tence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things, and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.  It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
OR. R. CIV. P. 36B. (1) (emphasis added).
115 See  Vaughan v. Taylor, 79 Or. App. 359, 365 n.7, 718 P.2d 1387, 1391 n.7 (1986)
(quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2001 (1st ed. 1970)).
116 State ex rel . Thesman v. Dooley, 270 Or. 37, 42, 526 P.2d 563, 566 (1974) (rul-
ing on former discovery rules prior to adoption of ORCP 36B).
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privilege recognized in Oregon—protects routine personnel files
of a tortfeasor from disclosure, no matter what label they
carry.117  Because Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP)
Rule 36 is nearly identical to its federal counterpart, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 26, courts have applied
federal law interpreting the federal discovery rule when Oregon
law is silent on a point.118  Under federal law, personnel files are
discoverable and must be produced when relevant or when tend-
ing to lead to relevant evidence.119  The existence of documents
corroborating child abuse or showing evidence of similar
problems in a priest’s file is most certainly relevant to a child
abuse victim’s cause of action.  The fact that Church administra-
tion would like to keep such documents confidential by claiming
they are akin to information gained in the sacred confessional is
beside the point.  The information in these files is not given in a
confessional context or even usually in a context that triggers the
protections of Oregon’s broad clergy-penitent privilege; accord-
ingly, these files deserve no more protection than employee files
of any other institution.
Although Oregon case law has little in the way of discussion
on discovery of “secret” Church files, other jurisdictions have ex-
amined discovery of sub-secreto files in some depth.  In People v.
Campobello ,120 the State of Illinois sought documents from the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockford in the prosecution of a
priest for child sex abuse.121  The Church asserted the clergy-
penitent privilege, but the Illinois Appellate Court rejected this
application of the privilege, holding that it applied only to state-
ments constituting admissions or confessions for the purposes of
117 See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.225-.273 (2005) (listing privileges in
Oregon).
118 See  Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 46 Or. App. 795, 799, 613 P.2d 104, 106
(1980) (recognizing the similarity between ORCP 36 and FRCP 26 and applying
federal decisions regarding protective orders).  The Oregon Supreme Court recog-
nizes that it was the intention of the Oregon Legislature to bring Oregon procedural
law, including the law of discovery, into line with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. State ex rel. Thesman , 270 Or. at 42, 526 P.2d at 566 (citing Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc. v. Main, 240 Or. 533, 537, 402 P.2d 746, 748 (1965)).
119 Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604-05 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (or-
dering production of personnel files and noting that defendant had identified no
case law supporting the proposition that personnel files are privileged); Ladson v.
Ulltra E. Parking Corp., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 140, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that no privacy privilege protects against disclosure of personnel files).
120 810 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
121 Id.  at 311.
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spiritually counseling or consoling individuals.122
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Stewart ,123 a defendant charged
with murdering a priest subpoenaed documents kept in the secret
archives of a Roman Catholic diocese.124  After the Church
raised the clergy-communicant privilege, the court required an in
camera review of the documents.125  The court went on to hold
that the documents were discoverable with the exception of con-
fessional information.126  In rejecting the Allentown Diocese’s at-
tempted application of the privilege, the court noted, “[n]early
every jurisdiction in the United States has recognized a clergy-
communicant privilege and, like Pennsylvania, requires the com-
munication to have been motivated by penitential or spiritual
considerations.”127  The Pennsylvania court also specifically re-
jected the diocese’s argument that the privilege should extend to
communications based solely on a clergyman’s religious status,
observing that such an interpretation would “effectively extend
the privilege to communications involving entirely secular
concerns.”128
However, whatever the reasons behind the different courts’ re-
quirements of in camera review, the effect is a positive one for
victims of sexual abuse.  This is particularly true when one con-
siders the difference in the nature of information spoken within
the walls of a confessional booth and that memorialized in writ-
ing in church archives.  Moreover, courts have rightly gone out of
122 The Appellate Court of Illinois said:
In our view, the clergy member privilege extends only to information that
an individual conveys in the course of making an admission or confession
to a clergy member in his capacity as spiritual counselor.  We reject the
Diocese’s suggestion that a clergy member’s “professional character” is
broader than his role as “spiritual advisor” under [the statutory privilege].
Id.  at 320.
123 690 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1997).
124 Id.  at 196.
125 Id.  at 201-02.  The in camera review was ordered in part because the diocese’s
motion to quash did not describe what information contained in the documents was
obtained in secrecy by a church official acting as a spiritual advisor to the murdered
priest. Id. See also  Niemann v. Cooley, 637 N.E.2d 943, 949-50 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994) (ordering in camera inspection of archdiocese files); Hutchison v. Luddy, 606
A.2d 905, 908-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
126 Stewart , 690 A.2d at 201.
127 Id.  at 198.
128 Id.  at 200; see also  Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 2003-IA-
00743-SCT (¶¶ 116-17) (Miss. 2005) (holding that priest-penitent privilege was not
applicable to documents “clearly not directed to anyone in their ‘professional char-
acter as spiritual adviser’”).
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their way to avoid any chilling effect by reassuring churches and
clergy that the in camera review process provides adequate pro-
tections by allowing church representatives to make relevancy,
privilege, and confidentiality arguments.129  Finally, it is impor-
tant to note that not all courts have allowed such broad discovery
and in camera review of church documents.  Rather, discovery
requests of religious organizations have been successfully
quashed in state courts with surprising frequency, despite the
negative effects that such decisions have on past and potential
future victims of clergy sexual abuse.130
By its terms, the clergy privilege should be limited in all cases
to those disclosures made about a spiritual matter while the re-
cipient of the disclosure is under an obligation of secrecy.
Churches have no legitimate privacy interest in protecting their
documentary records of abuse by employee-clergy.  In assessing
claims of clergy privilege, courts rightly tend to keep in mind the
policy rationale behind the privilege.  The clergy-penitent privi-
lege was meant to benefit society by allowing individuals to seek
absolution and spiritual guidance, not protect churches from lia-
bility for the sexual abuse of their ministers.131  The courts have
been justifiably reluctant to extend the clergy-penitent privilege
to all conversations among religious members or clergy.132
129 Stewart , 690 A.2d at 202.
130 For example, in Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp ., when
the plaintiffs sought deposition of the abusive priest and two of his bishop-supervi-
sors, the court issued a protective order.  825 A.2d 153, 179 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)
(citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1984)), rev’d on other
grounds and remanded , 884 A.2d 981 (Pa. 2005).  On appeal, the court ultimately
upheld the protective order. Id . at 187. See also  Jeffrey Hunter Moon, Protection
Against the Discovery or Disclosure of Church Documents and Records , 39 CATH.
LAW. 27 app. at 52-54 (1999) (collecting cases holding that diocese records are not
discoverable in civil trial).
131 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priest-penitent privi-
lege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and
absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive
priestly consolation and guidance in return.”).
132 Consider the holdings in a local case, In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Portland , 335 B.R. 815 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).  There, in the course of a Chapter 11
bankruptcy case, the court was faced with an adversary proceeding brought to re-
cover for the alleged negligence of the archdiocese in dealing with earlier allegations
of sexual misconduct by its priests. Id.  at 820-21.  The court held that it could right-
fully depose witnesses regarding:  (1) the archdiocese’s policies and practices in han-
dling sexual misconduct by priests against minors, including incidents occurring after
the last date of abuse alleged by complainants, and (2) internal church organization
and practices that affected the pattern, practice, and policies regarding allegations of
sex abuse. Id.  at 821-25.  The court went on to rule that the clerical privilege under
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3. Medical and Psychological Treatment Records
The use of mental health professionals by the Church to evalu-
ate priests accused or acknowledged to have abused a child has
been a standard and sometimes controversial practice for de-
cades.133  Of course, these processes do not usually represent a
communication by a penitent to a clergy member—even if the
priest is considered as the penitent—unless the psychologist or
psychiatrist is a clergy member and the communications are in-
tended to be confidential as part of a confessional rite.  This is
not usually the scenario that has transpired in treatment settings.
The questions get more interesting when the reports or records
of treatment are sent to third parties, say a supervising bishop or
superior.  Indeed, in Fearing v. Bucher , one of the most hotly
contested issues on remand before trial was the discoverability of
treatment records of the accused priest.
As a general rule, evidentiary privileges do not apply when a
communication that would otherwise be privileged is intention-
ally relayed to a third party.134  For example, in situations where
Oregon law only protected communications made to clergy in furtherance of spiri-
tual advice. Id.  at 827, 829-30.  As such, the court held that the complainants could
not depose a former archbishop about his activities and communications while serv-
ing on a confidential religious body at the Vatican. Id.  at 834-36.  This result in
Archbishop of Portland  is ironic in that the potential for serious negative effects on
free exercise of religion was much more likely in the areas in which the court al-
lowed discovery than it was in the area in which the court barred discovery.
133 For an interesting overview of the Catholic Church’s use of treatment centers
for sexually abusive priests, see Barry Werth, Fathers’ Helper , NEW YORKER, June 9,
2003, at 61.  For an in-depth look at the advent, use, and abuse of the Catholic
Church’s treatment centers for sexually abusive priests, see A.W. Richard Sipe, Pre-
liminary Expert Report , http://www.richardsipe.com/reports/sipe_report.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2006) (discussing, in part, the “fusion of psychiatry/psychology and
the opening of Catholic treatment centers”).  For a case study about the procedures
and problems of Catholic treatment centers for sexually abusive priests, see Steve
McGonigle, Diocese Was Silent on Accused Priests:  Amarillo Bishops Hired 8 Pas-
tors from Church-Run Treatment Centers , DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 2004,
available at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/usccb/natureandscope/dioceses/
amarillotx.htm.
According to Steve McGonigle:
[The bishop] said he hid the truth about . . . priests hired from treatment
programs as part of an after-care program intended to keep them from
committing new offenses.  The priests also were required to meet monthly
with the bishop, return to [the treatment center] every six months, attend a
support group headed by a psychologist and receive individual counseling
. . . .
Id.
134 Oregon Evidence Code Rule 511 provides that the holder of a privilege
“waives the privilege if the person . . . voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure
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a priest is asked by his superiors to receive a psychological as-
sessment, the priest is usually asked to sign a waiver so that his
superiors can receive a report.  The act of signing the waiver has
the legal effect of demonstrating the priest’s intention that the
report be relayed to a third party.  As such, the priest goes into
the psychological evaluation and treatment knowing that it will
be relayed to his employers, and consequently the results of the
evaluation and subsequent treatment are not privileged under
most states’ psychotherapist-patient privilege.135
Likewise, in considering the application of this privilege it is
important to note that under Oregon law, by definition a com-
munication is not “confidential” if it is intended to be relayed to
third parties to whom the privilege or another privilege does not
apply.136  Thus, like the scenario mentioned above, the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege is not implicated when a priest seeks
of any significant part of the matter or communication.” OR. EVID. CODE Rule 511
(codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 40.280 (2005)).  There is no “limited waiver” of a
privilege under Oregon law. See State v. Moore, 45 Or. App. 837, 843, 609 P.2d 866,
869 (1980) (rejecting state’s attempt to carve out a limited waiver of the attorney-
client privilege).
135 Oregon’s psychotherapist-patient privilege reads in relevant part:
(1)(a) “Confidential communication” means a communication not in-
tended to be disclosed to third persons except:
(A) Persons present to further the interest of the patient in the consul-
tation, examination or interview;
(B) Persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the commu-
nication; or
(C) Persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment
under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the
patient’s family.
(1)(b) “Patient” means a person who consults or is examined or inter-
viewed by a psychotherapist.
(1)(c) “Psychotherapist” means a person who is:
(A) Licensed, registered, certified or otherwise authorized under the
laws of any state to engage in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional condition; or
(B) Reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while so engaged.
(2) A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purposes
of diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental or emotional condition
among the patient, the patient’s psychotherapist or persons who are partici-
pating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychothera-
pist, including members of the patient’s family.
OR. EVID. CODE Rule 504(1)-(2) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 40.230 (2005)).
136 Id.  at 504(1)(a).
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treatment from a psychologist for the purpose of having the re-
port and the communications relayed to his superiors.
In conclusion, it is clear that the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege does not apply to psychological assessments required by a
clergy’s superiors if the findings, evaluations, or recommenda-
tions of the treatment are shared with the employer-diocese or
religious order.  Not only is this the current law, it is also good
policy, as noted by the Washington Supreme Court in rejecting a
similar effort to extend the psychotherapist-patient privilege to
records in an accused priest’s personnel file:
Legislative grants of testimonial privilege conflict with the in-
herent power of the courts to compel the production of rele-
vant evidence and are, therefore, strictly construed.
Even were we inclined to recognize a unity of interest be-
tween a cleric and his or her church and protect communica-
tions made in furtherance of that interest against compulsory
disclosure, this is not the case in which to do so.  Where child-
hood sexual abuse is at issue, even long established privileges
do not apply.137
D. Imposing Punitive Damages Against the Church
Punitive damages play an important role in tort law.  With an
institution as large as the Catholic Church, the argument goes,
the only way to enforce systematic change that will stop the wide-
spread pattern of abuse is to force the Church to take notice.138
Punitive damages force the Church to take notice by imposing a
serious financial punishment that deters the Church from failing
to remedy those elements of its internal structure that have incu-
bated a culture of abuse.  Nevertheless, while punitive damages
may generally be an accepted, though politically controversial,
remedy of tort law, even the possibility of imposing punitive
damages on religious institutions is a relatively new notion,139
137 C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 271 (Wash.
1999) (en banc) (citations omitted). See also Niemann v. Cooley, 637 N.E.2d 943,
952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that no privilege was present when a priest’s
counseling with a psychologist or psychiatrist was not for treatment but for the
Archdiocese to determine his future as a priest).
138 This is particularly true when an institution is large enough that it has the re-
sources and power to pay off each individual claimant in settlement rather than
change its internal policy or practice.
139 Two law professors made this observation:
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a person sexually molested by
someone acting on behalf of a religious organization would not have con-
templated legal action against the religious organization and would not
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and not without reason to give pause.
Historically, the imposition of punitive damages against a
church, or any other damages for that matter, was barred by the
doctrine of charitable immunity.140  Today, despite a momentary
resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s,141 the charitable im-
munity doctrine has been almost completely dissolved.  Since this
abrogation of the charitable immunity doctrine,142 churches have
have been successful in such an action had she tried.  By the beginning of
the twenty-first century, however, a person who had suffered such an injury
might well be a successful plaintiff in a suit against the wrongdoer, the ec-
clesiastical officials, and the religious entity in which the individual defend-
ants served.
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity ,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1797-98.
140 The American version of the charitable immunity doctrine arose out of several
English court decisions. E.g. , McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 434-36
(1876); Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 26-28 (1885).  Ironically, both of these
cases were already overruled in English law by the time they were adopted in the
United States.  Lupu & Tuttle, supra  note 139, at 1798 n.23 (citing Janet Fairchild,
Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities—Modern Status , 25
A.L.R. 4th 517, 522-23 (1983)).
More history shows that
[t]he doctrine was eventually adopted by nearly all American jurisdictions,
either by judicial decision or statute.  Charitable immunity rested on a
number of policy grounds, including a notion of implied trust limiting the
uses of the organization’s funds to its charitable purposes, and a theory that
beneficiaries of such services implicitly waived their right to sue in tort over
injuries suffered as a result of receiving the services.
Id.  (citing WILLIAM W. BASSETT, Religious Organizations and the Law §§ 7.2-.6
(2003)).
141 A decade ago, it was noted that the pendulum of tort liability may have been
swinging in the other direction:
More recently, a trend toward affording charities greater immunity has
re-emerged.  This trend is the result of rising insurance premiums, the re-
duced insurance coverage characteristic of the 1980s, and several high-
profile cases imposing enormous liability on nonprofit corporations.  How-
ever, legislatures and courts generally disagree on the extent of liability
that nonprofit corporations should be forced to bear, and the law around
the country is currently in a state of disarray.
Daniel A. Barfield, Note, Better to Give Than to Receive:  Should Nonprofit Corpo-
rations and Charities Pay Punitive Damages?  29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1193, 1196-97
(1995) (footnotes omitted).
142 The abrogation of the doctrine has been described as
[f]irst, a general decline in the doctrine of charitable immunity has made
possible a wide array of tort claims against religious organizations.  Under
this doctrine, which held sway in American courts from the late nineteenth
through the mid-twentieth centuries, nonprofit organizations were immune
from liability for torts that they or their agents committed against benefi-
ciaries of their services.  By the early 1960s, charitable immunity was
quickly eroding, especially with respect to medical malpractice claims
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continued to fight with vigor the imposition of punitive damages
in clergy abuse cases:
[R]eligious organizations are fighting the imposition of puni-
tive damages in clergy abuse cases. . . . The benefit of the dam-
ages lies in their power to deter future bad behavior and to
punish the person for their wrongful action.  In the case of im-
posing punitive damages against the Catholic Church for the
tortious actions of abusive priests, the justification is the same
as that of any other master/servant relationship:  “the imposi-
tion of punitive damages upon the employer serves as a deter-
rent to the employment of unfit persons for important
positions.”143
There are three general arguments that are made in opposition
to the imposition of punitive damages on a religious organiza-
tion.  The first is that churches will always seek to avoid punitive
damages by attempting to avoid the claims that most often lead
to the imposition of punitive damages altogether.  Obviously,
such attempts will run the gamut of procedural and statutory al-
legations of shortcomings in the plaintiff’s claim144 as well as ar-
against nonprofit hospitals.  In most states, the erosion was complete by the
mid-1980s.  Policy reasons for the shift are not hard to fathom:  the culture
had come to expect a legal remedy for nearly every injury, and institutions
seemed better able than the injured parties to absorb—or to purchase in-
surance to cover—the costs of such injuries.
Lupu & Tuttle, supra  note 139, at 1798-99 (footnotes omitted).
143 Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Pub-
lic Good , 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1167-68 (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b (1979)).
144 See  Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1998). In Secter , a young man brought suit against the diocese for sexual
abuse he suffered at the hands of a priest at his Catholic school. Id.  at 287.  On
appeal, the diocese argued against the imposition of punitive damages.  The diocese
reasoned that the malice or oppression necessary to support punitive damages could
not be proven against the diocese because the diocese did not know about the abuse
nor did the diocese have any reason to believe that this plaintiff would be abused
rather than another boy his age.  Id.  at 291.  The court ultimately rejected the dio-
cese’s argument and upheld the punitive damages award of $700,000. Id. See also
Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that
the issue of punitive damages against the “non-abusing” defendant church should
not be submitted to the jury because:  (1) under Wisconsin law, punitive damages
are only “available when the defendant acts in wanton, willful, or reckless disre-
gard,” and (2) the plaintiff failed to meet the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard); Hutchison ex rel.  Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052, 1059 (Pa. 1999).  In
Hutchison , a retarded boy was continually molested by a priest and later brought
suit for instances of abuse that were not barred by the statute of limitations. Id.  at
1053-54.  The incidents occurred in a motel off of the church property. Id.  At the
end of the trial, the jury awarded punitive damages of over one million dollars. Id.
at 1054.  The defendants appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which
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guments that the underlying case involved is barred by the First
Amendment.145
The second argument is that the imposition of punitive dam-
ages on a church is ultimately against the weight of public policy.
Those cases where a religious organization has argued that public
policy prohibits the court from imposing any  punitive damages
have generally been unsuccessful.  One example is Mrozka v.
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis ,146 a case brought by one
of many victims of a sexually abusive priest.  The jury held for
the plaintiff, awarding damages that included $2.7 million in pu-
nitive damages.147  On appeal, the defendant Archdiocese argued
that awarding punitive damages against a religious organization
was contrary to public policy.148  In making this argument, the
Archdiocese cited City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. ,149 argu-
ing that the same public policy concerns existed in its case.150
That is, punishment would not be an effective deterrent because
the damages would be inflicted on an innocent entity rather than
on the wrongdoers.151  The court disagreed, finding that the deci-
sion in City of Newport  turned on congressional intent, which
was not questionable in the case at hand.152
While arguments in attempt to bar all punitive damages
against religious institutions have been unsuccessful, some policy
arguments have succeeded in restricting the amount of punitive
damages in particular circumstances.  Thus, in Bredberg v.
Long ,153 the court allowed punitive damages against a religious
organization but not against its founders who were also sued in
reversed the jury’s award, finding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the
necessary control to impose liability for respondeat superior. See  Hutchison ex rel.
Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 836-45, 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).  The supreme
court reversed the superior court’s order and reinstated the jury’s award of punitive
damages. See  Hutchison ex rel.  Hutchison v. Luddy 870 A.2d 766 (Pa. 2005).  The
court found that the bishop and archdiocese’s “inaction in the face of such a menace
is not only negligent, it is reckless and abhorrent.”  742 A.2d at 1059.
145 See  Schwartz & Lorber, supra  note 22. R
146 482 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
147 Id. at 810.
148 Id.
149 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that punitive damages could not be awarded
against a municipality).
150 Mrozka , 482 N.W.2d at 810.
151 Id.
152 Id.  at 810-11.  The court also noted that “punitive damages have been allowed
against religious organizations in other jurisdictions.” Id.  at 811.
153 778 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1985).
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their personal capacity.154  The court’s decision was based on the
public policy implications raised by imposing punitive damages
against insolvent individuals rather than the fact that the organi-
zation was religious:
Punitive-damages awards must not exceed the level neces-
sary properly to punish and deter.  As we recently stated  . . .
“[W]e can see neither the justice nor sense in affirming a ver-
dict which cannot possibly be satisfied.  The purpose of puni-
tive damages is to punish [the wrongdoer] for outrageous
conduct, not to drain him of his life’s blood.”155
Therefore, the court reasoned, the punitive damages against
the individual founders had to be set aside.156  Clearly then, even
if public policy arguments will not pose a complete bar to the
imposition of punitive damages, arguments about exigent circum-
stances, such as insolvency, can still act as a serious restraint on a
plaintiff’s ability to recover for sexual abuse.
The third and final general defense against the imposition of
punitive damages most often raised by religious institutions is
comprised of constitutional arguments, particularly Establish-
ment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and hybrid arguments.  As
far as Establishment Clause arguments are concerned, churches
usually allege that the investigation by the court (or other gov-
ernment agency) required in order to impose punitive damages
would lead to excessive entanglement with religion in violation
of the First Amendment.157  However, these types of arguments
are rarely successful, particularly because the level of scrutiny
necessary to impose punitive damages is rarely more invasive
then that required to impose compensatory damages.158  In other
154 Id. at 1290.
155 Id.  (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
156 Id.
157 The Lemon  test, enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman , requires that government
action:  (1) must have a legitimate secular purpose, (2) must not have the primary
effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) must not result in an “exces-
sive entanglement” of the government and religion.  403 U.S. 602, 612-14 (1971).
158 For example, in Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis , the archdio-
cese argued that the imposition of punitive damages would violate the Establish-
ment Clause because the level of government inquiry into the reasonableness of the
archdiocese’s actions would amount to excessive entanglement.  482 N.W.2d 806,
811-12 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).  The court rejected this argument:
Here, the Church has conceded that an examination of the reasonableness
of its actions and the bases for its decisions regarding the placement and
discipline of [the abusive priest] is constitutionally allowable for purposes
of determining negligence and compensatory damages.  We cannot say that
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words, most courts have found that if the court has the authority
under the Constitution to hear the underlying claim in a particu-
lar case, it is unlikely that the additional consideration of puni-
tive damages will unconstitutionally infringe on the religious
institution’s First Amendment rights.159  However, it is important
to note that some courts have been persuaded by these types of
Establishment Clause arguments.160
examination of these same matters with regard to the possible imposition
of punitive damages constitutes excessive entanglement.
Id. at 812.
159 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, No. C 97-3006 SI, 1998 WL
273011, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 1998), rev’d , 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999). Bollard
was a sexual harassment case where the plaintiff alleged wrongful constructive ter-
mination from candidacy for the priesthood.  1998 WL 273011, at *1.  In its discus-
sion, the trial court stated:
The prospect of punitive damages, designed to change defendants’ conduct
of Formation, would also involve the Court in an unconstitutional intrusion
into the relationship between the Society of Jesus and its clergy. . . .
. . . .
The Court concludes that the “ministerial exception” to Title VII and the
Establishment Clause’s concern with the “entanglement” and interference
of federal government in church autonomy prohibit the Court from exer-
cising jurisdiction over the present case.
Id.  at *5.  However, the Ninth Circuit eventually reversed that decision, finding that
the scope of the ministerial exception to Title VII is limited to what is nec-
essary to comply with the First Amendment. . . .
In this case, as in the case of lay employees, the Free Exercise rationales
supporting an exception to Title VII are missing.  The Jesuits do not offer a
religious justification for the harassment Bollard alleges; indeed, they con-
demn it as inconsistent with their values and beliefs.  There is thus no dan-
ger that, by allowing this suit to proceed, we will thrust the secular courts
into the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on ques-
tions of religious faith or doctrine.  The Jesuits’ disavowal of the harass-
ment also reassures us that application of Title VII in this context will have
no significant impact on their religious beliefs or doctrines.
196 F.3d at 947.
160 Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  In Schmidt , the
plaintiff brought suit against her pastor, who initiated inappropriate sexual conduct
with her after she enrolled in counseling with him in 1960 when she was twelve. Id.
at 324.  The plaintiff left the church seventeen years later but remained in counseling
under the defendant-pastor until 1989, when the plaintiff was in her early forties. Id.
The plaintiff left counseling after she began psychotherapy and realized that the
pastor had been sexually abusive. Id.  Here again, the defendants raised the First
Amendment as a defense to the case as a whole. Id.  at 332.  Interestingly, the court
found that any imposition of damages would have a “chilling effect” and violate the
First Amendment, specifically the Establishment Clause:
[A]ny inquiry into the policies and practices of the Church Defendants in
hiring or supervising their clergy raises . . . First Amendment problems of
entanglement . . . . Church governance is founded in scripture, modified by
reformers over almost two millenia. . . .
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A second type of constitutional argument often made in oppo-
sition to punitive damages is that allowing such damages against
religious institutions would unreasonably infringe upon the relig-
ious actor’s right to freely exercise one’s religion.  Under the
Smith161 standard for a Free Exercise claim, a church making
such an argument must make one of two showings.  The first is
that the imposition of punitive damages is occurring under a law
that is not neutral or generally applied.162  The second is that
there is a “hybrid” right that would be violated by the imposition
of punitive damages.163 If the Church succeeds in showing either
of these, the burden then shifts to the government to show that
the imposition of punitive damages is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.  While some courts have been per-
suaded by such arguments, most Free Exercise defenses to puni-
tive damages are unsuccessful.164
. . . It would therefore also be inappropriate and unconstitutional for this
Court to determine after the fact that the ecclesiastical authorities negli-
gently supervised or retained the defendant Bishop.  Any award of dam-
ages would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state control over the
future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination, a result violative of
the text and history of the establishment clause.
Id.
161 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
162 One creative (though ultimately unsuccessful) Free Exercise argument was
posed in Mrozka .  482 N.W.2d at 810.  In an attempt to avoid a $2.7 million punitive
damages award, the archdiocese argued that the state’s exemption of municipalities
from punitive damages (without an exemption for nonprofits or churches) was a
system of individual exemption that was not neutral and applicable to all. Id.  at 811.
As such, the archdiocese argued, the state was required to extend an exemption in
the cases of religious hardship unless they could prove a compelling state interest;
otherwise, the law amounted to a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id.  The
court rejected the archdiocese’s assessment of the law as less than neutral. Id.  The
court went on to state that, in the alternative, even if the exemption was not neutral,
“the state’s interest in protecting children from dangerous behavior is sufficiently
compelling to justify any indirect burden the Church might incur by having its exter-
nal actions subject to sanction.” Id.
163 See Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203, 251-
53, 644 P.2d 577, 607-08, review denied , 293 Or. 456 (1982) (defendant church argu-
ing that the imposition of punitive damages for a claim of fraud implicated both its
free exercise and free speech rights).
164 But see Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 680 (Tex. 1996).  In Tilton , the
plaintiff brought suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud against
a pastor and the Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church. Id.  at 675.  The
claims arose when the plaintiffs sent prayer requests with donations to a televised
pastor who promised that if they did so, he would pray for the individuals and their
requests would be granted. Id.  at 675-76.  When the plaintiff’s prayers were not all
answered (including a prayer for healing of a terminally ill woman who subsequently
died of cancer), the plaintiffs sued. Id.  The defendant pastor and church objected
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In the end, under most circumstances in Oregon, the Church
may well be held liable for punitive damages if its actions can be
said to have crossed the line drawn by Oregon’s punitive dam-
ages statute, ORS 31.730:  that is, the conduct constituted “reck-
less and outrageous indifference” to the risk of harm posed by an
abusive priest.165
CONCLUSION
It is nearly impossible to overstate the emotional and psycho-
logical damage done to children by trusted adults who sexually
abuse them.  It is akin to taking a razor blade to a child’s face.
The scars never go away, and they permanently disfigure.  The
only difference in sexual abuse is that the scars are on the in-
side—in the mind, the emotions, the heart, and the soul.  And
when the abuse is perpetrated by a person of religious authority,
the wounds often additionally destroy any sense of awe, wonder,
and trust that produces transcendent faith of any kind—and es-
pecially a mature and robust religious faith.  Additionally, when
that religious authority is vested with the mantle of the near-
absolute spiritual and emotional power given to Catholic priests
by their communities, the children victimized by these seemingly
sacred adults experience a kind of spiritual amputation.  The
lopped-off parts never really grow back.  Even with relatively
“less severe” abuse, such as fondling, or even with abuse occur-
ring “only” once, the damage has been done.  How many times
does it take before a razor blade scars a face?  For it is certainly
true that the damage is in the betrayal as much as in the physical
act.  In some ways, it often seems that the survivors would have
been better off, from a spiritual and mental health standpoint, if
to the suits, which would have subjected them to punitive damages. Id.  They ar-
gued that by inquiring into whether unanswered prayer was actionable under tort
law, the court would violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses. See id.  at 676.  When the trial court refused to grant the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, the case eventually rose to the Texas Supreme
Court.  The Texas Supreme Court ruled that it would not permit plaintiffs to recover
damages for mental anguish:  “To allow mental anguish damages or punitive dam-
ages against defendants in this case would be to chill defendants [sic] free exercise of
religion.  A person can hardly exercise his religion freely, knowing that he may
someday be required to pay mental anguish or punitive damages.” Id.  at 693
(Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165 See  Bolt v. Influence, Inc., 333 Or. 572, 578, 43 P.3d 425, 428 (2002) (“[T]he
legislature intended the trial court to determine the sufficiency of evidence support-
ing a claim for punitive damages under the well-established ‘no evidence’ standard
. . . .”).
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they had been molested by total strangers:  in that instance, they
would have certainly learned that the world is sometimes not a
safe place in which to trust strangers.  But with priests and other
religious leaders, the children learn that, as it seems, they cannot
trust anyone .  This makes functioning relationships of trust,
friendship, love, or faith practically unworkable.  As juries are
asked in such cases, how much is it worth in dollars—our system
measures damages in no other way—for a person to lose the abil-
ity to love?  To trust?  To live in wonder and awe?  To believe in
anything transcendent?  The answer is as troubling, difficult, and
potentially as explosive as anything in the justice system.
The cost to individual lives and society of such betrayal and
abuse is staggering:  the damage in these young lives often begins
to show early in school performance, disciplinary records, juve-
nile crime, and drug or alcohol abuse.  Later in life it manifests
itself in broken marriages, families, violence, unemployment,
antisocial conduct, and criminal histories—including all too often
the most heartbreaking and bizarre result of all:  the survivors
repeat the behavior foisted upon them by acting it out with chil-
dren in their own lives, re-creating the circle of abuse and devas-
tation.  One client of ours—we will call him “Bill”—came from a
troubled family and at age eight was sent to a home for such
youngsters run by the Catholic Church.  At age eleven he was
abused by a notorious priest at the home; at age fourteen he was
subjected to group abuse by other boys; at age sixteen he was
coerced to engage in predatory conduct with younger boys in the
priest’s presence; and at eighteen he was a predator himself.  He
was convicted of child abuse in his early twenties and is incarcer-
ated today, nearing the end of a two-decade sentence for child
sexual crimes.  In many ways, he never had a chance.  How do we
attempt to measure the cost to society of such a story—quite
apart from the cost to Bill himself?  How much has it cost to
incarcerate the man all these years?  How much to heal or reha-
bilitate all the other boys victimized by the priest or the children
victimized by Bill himself?  How do we count the cost of the ad-
dictions, the broken families, the lost jobs, and the domestic vio-
lence?  How, indeed?
Asking such questions is not merely a rhetorical exercise.  The
answers must respond to the question of why an otherwise
respected institution such as the Roman Catholic Church should
as a matter of social policy be held responsible for the devasta-
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tion done in its name.  The answers must explain why the law,
whether through the traditional theory of tortious negligence or
the more unique Oregon-style theory of vicarious liability based
on respondeat superior, is rightly used as a tool of justice and
restitution for these victims.  And, finally, as this Article has at-
tempted to show, the answers must respond to objections, based
on religious liberty and constitutional concerns, that the financial
or religious burdens to the Catholic Church of such justice are
somehow out of balance with its responsibility or the true human
costs of the abuse.
Those burdens, whatever they might be, are not out of balance
with the costs of abuse.  As articulated at the outset of this Arti-
cle, the old balancing exercise for civil liberties articulated by
thinkers through Anglo-American legal history has wisely held
that no civil right—including religious liberty—is absolute.  In-
stead, these rights must be balanced against the practical reality
of what it means to live in a society made up of diverse and
sometimes opposing values and interests.  This has surely never
been truer than in the context of child sexual abuse.
But more than that, it should not be assumed, as the Church
has sometimes suggested, that society’s interest in protecting chil-
dren from child abuse or in supporting restitution for its adult
victims is at odds with the deepest values of the Catholic Church.
Indeed, to the extent that the law holds the perpetrators of child
abuse and the institutions that sponsored the relationships out of
which the abuse occurred wholly responsible for the individual
and social damage done, it echoes the words of the Lord of the
Catholic Church himself, who was heard to say:  “Let the little
children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of
God belongs to such as these.  I tell you the truth, anyone who
will not receive the kingdom of God like a little child will never
enter it,”166 and “[i]t would be better for him if a millstone were
hung around his neck and he were thrown into the sea, than that
he would cause one of these little ones to stumble.”167  No of-
fense is done, either to core concepts of religious liberty in the
civic constitutions of our society or to the core teachings in the
“constitution” of the Catholic Church, to demand that full justice
be done for the crimes against children committed in the name of
the Church.
166 Mark  10:14-15 (New International Version).
167 Luke  17:2 (New American Standard Bible).
